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Federalizing Education by Waiver?
Derek W Black*
In the fall of 2011, the U.S. Secretary of Education told states he would
use his statutory power to waive violations of the No Child Left Behind Act
("NCLB'), but only on the condition that they adopt his new education policies-
policies that had already failed to move forward in Congress. States had no
choice but to agree because eighty percent of their schools were faced with
serious statutory sanctions. As a result, the Secretary was able to unilaterally
dictate core education policies for the nation's public schools. For the first time,
the content of school curriculum and the means by which schools would
evaluate teachers came under the direct influence of a federal official. This
Article demonstrates that this exercise of power was beyond the scope of the
Secretary's statutory or constitutional authority.
To be clear, Congress can confer to agencies the power to impose policies
through waiver conditions, but Congress must do so clearly and place limits on
the scope of the conditions. NCLB contained no notice that states might face
waiver conditions when they first agreed to participate in NCLB, much less
notice of the substance of those conditions. Spending Clause doctrine requires
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both. Moreover, states' inability to say no to these conditions raises serious
questions of unconstitutional coercion.
The Secretary also exercised the equivalent of lawmaking power when
he imposed wide-reaching conditions with no statutory guidance from
Congress. To avoid the difficult separation of powers issues this raises, however,
a reviewing court might narrowly construe the statutory authority conferred to
the Secretary. The statutory analysis is easy. The Secretary lacks explicit
authority to condition waivers. At best, NCLB implies authority to condition
waivers, but implied conditions would be limited to the scope of NCLB itself.
The waiver conditions the Secretary imposed go well beyond the scope of NCLB.
For instance, the text of NCLB specifically prohibits the Secretary from
requiring "specific instructional content, academic achievement standards and
assessments, [or] curriculum." In short, NCLB waivers are void on multiple
grounds.
This unilateral imposition of policy through waiver conditions is
remarkable not only for its transformation of key aspects of education but also
for the entire federal administrative state. It opens the door to the spread of a
more expansive administrative power than ever seen before. Current
scholarship and precedent provide almost no direction for this spread. This
Article does, calling into doubt the constitutionality and efficacy of the power to
remake law through waiver.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Two of the most significant events in the history of public
education occurred over the course of the past five years. First, after
two centuries of local control and variation, states adopted a national
approach to "curriculum."' Second, states changed the way they would
1. Editorial, Caution and the Common Core, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2013, at A18, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/28/opinion/caution-and-the-common-core-state-education-
standards.html, archived at http://perma.cc/L5MM-N3DP (indicating forty-five states had adopted
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evaluate and retain teachers, significantly altering teachers' most
revered right, tenure.2 A significant number of states had previously
the curriculum). A lively debate persists over whether the Common Core is actually curriculum.
The Common Core State Standards Initiative website states:
The Common Core is not a curriculum. It is a clear set of shared goals and expectations
for what knowledge and skills will help our students succeed. Local teachers, principals,
superintendents, and others will decide how the standards are to be met. Teachers will
continue to devise lesson plans and tailor instruction to the individual needs of the
students in their classrooms.
Myths and Facts, COMMON CORE STATE STANDARDS INITIATIVE, http://www.corestandards.org/
about-the-standards/myths-vs-facts/, archived at http://perma.cc/777V-LVG7 (last visited Jan. 15,
2015). This Article does not seek to settle the debate over whether the Common Core is a
curriculum, as the debate seems driven largely by politics and defined by semantics. It suffices to
say that, if by "curriculum" one means a list of books or facts that a student must learn, the
Common Core is not a curriculum (although it will include core book lists from which districts and
teachers should choose). If by "curriculum" one means what one teaches in general or the skills
and competencies one expects students to learn, the Common Core is a curriculum, particularly
given that it requires states to replace what states and localities formerly understood to be
curriculum. What is undisputable is that the Common Core sets the standards to which states
must conform their curricula. Thus, at best (for those who would defend the Secretary's actions),
the Common Core is a set of curriculum standards, and a distinction between curriculum
standards and curriculum-if there is a meaningful one-is not one that would save the
Secretary's actions from the legal analysis contained herein.
For the purposes of this Article, I define or understand curriculum to pertain to those
things that will and will not be taught in the classroom, but I also emphasize that various
institutions and individuals play a role in what is taught. Collectively these actions and choices
represent the curriculum. Broad decisions about the curriculum are made at the state level, and
more precise decisions are made at the district level. Any gaps or discretion remaining after those
actors exert their influence are left to principals and teachers. Understood this way, to argue that
curriculum pertains solely to those things that teachers, schools, or districts choose for classroom
instruction is untenable. One must acknowledge that those local actors can only choose within the
universe that the state creates and leaves for them, and that the state need not leave any choice
for them. That the state might leave options for inferior officers does not transform what would
have otherwise been state curriculum into no more than academic standards.
This understanding of curriculum, moreover, is consistently reflected in courts' approach
to resolving numerous disputes between teachers and school officials over what is taught in the
classroom. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988):
[S]chool-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities
that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear
the imprimatur of the school . . . may fairly be characterized as part of the school
curriculum, whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long as they
are supervised by faculty members and designed to impart particular knowledge or
skills to student participants and audiences.;
Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 624 F.3d 332, 338 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that teachers' right to
free speech is not protected for in-class curricular speech made pursuant to their official duties);
Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 370 (4th Cir. 1998) ("[Slchool administrative
authorities had a legitimate pedagogical interest in the makeup of the curriculum of the
school . . . ."). Like these cases, the current battle is not really over what curriculum is but over
who controls curriculum. Most telling may be the fact that the fight over the semantics of
curriculum did not grow heated until the Common Core became a political battle, which was a few
years after the process of creating it and adopting it had begun.
2. See, e.g., Bruce Baker et al., The Legal Consequences ofMandating High Stakes Decisions
Based on Low Quality Information: Teacher Evaluation in the Race-to-the-Top Era, EDUC. POL'Y
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taken some voluntary steps toward these ends, but in 2012, states lost
the choice. Nearly all of the nation's schools were projected to be labeled
as failing under the No Child Left Behind Act ("NCLB") that fall. 3 The
Secretary of Education, Arne Duncan, had the power to waive states'
failure, but he indicated he would only do so if states accepted new
requirements that would move education in an entirely new direction. 4
Relying on what previously appeared to be a relatively narrow statutory
waiver mechanism, the Secretary was able to impose his policy agenda
for curriculum standards and teacher quality on almost all of the
nation's schools.6 As a practical matter, he federalized core aspects of
education in just a few short months.6
This unilateral action is remarkable not only for education policy
but also from a constitutional balance-of-power perspective. Some
scholars and politicians have called for the expansion of conditional
waivers in other areas of federal regulation.7 Yet, as efficacious as
unilateral action through statutory waiver might be, conditional waiver
power is unconstitutional absent carefully crafted legislative authority.
Secretary Duncan lacked that authority. Thus, the federalization of
education through conditional waivers was momentous, but legally
unfounded.
ANALYSIS ARCHIVES, Jan. 28, 2013, at 1; Winnie Hu, 10 States Are Given Waivers from Education
Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2012, at A13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/10/
education/10-states-given-waivers-from-no-child-left-behind-law.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/7B58-MHSQ.
3. Sam Dillon, Overriding a Key Education Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8,2011, atA12, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/08/education/08educ.html?pagewanted=all, archived at http://
perma.cc/CRN8-WEP6 (predicting that the number of failing schools would reach eighty thousand
out of one-hundred thousand in 2011).
4. Hu, supra note 2.
5. See ESEA Flexibility, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., http://www.ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/esea-
flexibility/index.html, archived at http://perma.cclY5N2-UBWQ (last modified Dec. 19, 2014)
(indicating that forty-five states applied for waivers and the Department had granted forty-three).
6. A prepublication draft of this Article was released on August 24, 2014. In the months
that followed, states increasingly began to push back against this federal exercise of power. Many
did so for reasons having little to do with the arguments contained in this Article, but at least two
explicitly relied upon this article in challenging the Department of Education's authority. See
Letter from Governor Rick Scott to Sec'y Arne Duncan, Request to Designate Jurisdiction to the
Office of Administrative Law Judges 5 (Oct. 17, 2014), available at http://www.flgov.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/Florida-Request-to-Secretary-Arne-Duncan.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/8VQM-3DJ5; Letter from Sean D. Reyes, Attorney Gen., State of Utah, to Gary Herbert,
Governor, Common Core Standards Legal Analysis 1 (Oct. 7, 2014), available at
http://schoolboard.utah.gov/wp-content/uploads/Common-Core-Report-FINAL-1.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/SU86-9AD4. Since then, the U.S. Department of Education has begun to retreat
from its earlier hardline positions. See, e.g., Alyson Klein, Added Waiver Leeway for Some States,
EDUC. WEEK, Jan. 7, 2015, at 20.
7. See, e.g., David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. 265, 292 (2013).
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When Congress passed NCLB in 2002, the waiver condition
terms that Secretary Duncan imposed were inconceivable. The key
provisions of NCLB required states to move all students to academic
proficiency by 2014 and ensure that all teachers of core subjects were
highly qualified.8 While setting these national goals, the Act left the
substance of meeting these goals to states and school districts. States
and districts retained control of the curriculum they would teach, the
standards for that curriculum, the exams they would use to test
students, the meaning of academic proficiency, and the certification and
evaluation of teachers.9 The federal role was to hold states accountable
for meeting the standards that states themselves would set. 1o Scholars
characterized NCLB as a model of cooperative federalism, through
which states and the federal government shared responsibility.1 ' To be
clear, this was a new and significant federal role, but a limited one.
NCLB, however, was beset by numerous flaws. Many states
manipulated their standards and tests in an effort to manufacture
higher levels of "proficiency."1 2 The requirement that all students reach
proficiency, however, was just too high. The same was true in regard to
requirement for highly qualified teachers. By the summer of 2011,
eighty percent of the nation's school districts were a few months away
from failure under the Act due to insufficient progress toward full
proficiency, and the number of failing schools would only grow until the
final deadline of 2014.13 Failure under the Act would trigger stiff
sanctions, including the restructuring of schools and districts and the
potential loss of funds.14
Both Congress and the President anticipated this failure and its
disastrous consequences for education coming well in advance.
Amending NCLB had been a topic of national debate since at least
8. See James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 932, 932-33 (2004).
9. Id. at 941-42.
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Kamina Aliya Pinder, Federal Demand and Local Choice: Safeguarding the
Notion ofFederalism in Education Law and Policy, 39 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 2 (2010) (noting that NCLB
followed the classic paradigm of cooperative federalism); see also Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The
High Cost of Education Federalism, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 287, 292-93 (2013) (analyzing the
cooperative federalism approach to education in recent decades).
12. Paul E. Peterson & Frederick M. Hess, Few States Set World-Class Standards, EDUC.
NEXT, Summer 2008, at 70, 71-72 (finding that three-quarters of states had lowered their
standards).
13. Dillon, supra note 3.
14. 20 U.S.C § 6316(b)(7) (2012).
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2008.15 In 2010, President Obama issued an official blueprint for
reforming the Act. 16 Bitter political division over health care and the
economy, however, blocked almost all legislation in Congress, and
NCLB reform became an indirect casualty. NCLB, fortunately, included
an escape clause. It granted the Secretary of Education the power to
waive noncompliance and its consequences for states."
This waiver power, coupled with the impending failure of eighty
percent of school districts, became the means through which the Obama
Administration implemented its educational agenda outside of the
legislative process. Rather than simply waive noncompliance and avert
the disastrous consequences for districts until new legislation passed,
the Secretary placed specific conditions on the waivers. To receive a
waiver, states would have to meet an entirely new set of requirements
pertaining to curriculum, student achievement data, and teacher
evaluations.18 Tellingly, these terms were identical to those the
President had proposed to Congress in 2010,19 and which Congress
chose not to adopt-terms that the Administration had previously
indicated would move education in an entirely different direction from
NCLB. 20 Therein lies the key.
Without any specific legislative authority, the Secretary
imposed new conditions on states that go beyond the scope of the
underlying statute. States' impending failure, the consequences they
would face, and the Secretary's power to waive noncompliance
permitted the Secretary to coerce states into accepting terms of which
they had no notice they would ever face when they first agreed to
participate in NCLB. Until the circumstance presented itself, the
Department had not even intimated that it had the power to impose
policy through waivers. To the contrary, it had petitioned Congress for
new legislation. 21 Moreover, given the scope of the policy changes the
15. See, e.g., Maria Glod, In Rush to White House, 'No Child' is Left Behind; Obama, McCain
Reveal Little on Updates for Plan, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2008, at A4, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/14/AR2008091402461.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/2PLR-2RUA
16. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM (2010), available at http://www.ed.gov/
policy/elsec/leg/blueprint/blueprint.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/YHZ2-YN7W.
17. 20 U.S.C. § 7861(a).
18. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., ESEA FLEXIBILITY 4 (June 7, 2012), available at
https://www.ed.gov/sites/default/files/esea-flexibility.doc.
19. Compare id. (Secretary's requirements for waiver), with U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note
16 (terms proposed in 2010).
20. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 16, at 2.
21. See, e.g., Sec'y Arne Duncan, Remarks at the Monthly Stakeholders Meeting:
Reauthorization of ESEA: Why We Can't Wait, (Sept. 24, 2009), available at
2015]1 613
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Administration sought, it is not clear that the changes could have been
constitutionally achieved through waiver even had NCLB explicitly
granted the Secretary power to condition waivers.
No doubt, NCLB reform was absolutely necessary, and the
Administration's reforms may have been a step in the right direction.
In the past, numerous leading scholars, including the author of this
Article, have repeatedly advocated for the expansion of the federal role
in education.22 But scholars have predicated federal expansion in
education on new legislative measures that Congress should take to
increase its stake in funding and supporting education. 23 No one
imagined that the federal government could substantively reform
curriculum standards and teacher evaluations without new legislation,
much less do it preemptively through administrative action. The waiver
process happened so quickly and unilaterally that it was not until it was
over that Congress, state officials, and scholars seriously considered
whether the Secretary did, in fact, have the power he purported to
exercise. 24 The extent of Congress's constitutional authority to
http://www2.ed.gov/news/speeches/2009/09/09242009.html, archived at http://perma.cc/N47U-
MR5P (highlighting the need for a new education law that promotes "well-rounded education").
22. See, e.g., Derek W. Black, The Congressional Failure to Enforce Equal Protection Through
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 313, 323 (2010) ("Congress ... has
the ability through funding, administrative structures, and legislation to exercise more expansive
power."); William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When "Adequate" Isn't: The Retreat from Equity in
Educational Law and Policy and Why It Matters, 56 EMoRY L.J. 545, 554 (2006); Goodwin Liu,
Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330, 404 (2006) ("[A]n approach that
gives meaningful content to the national citizenship guarantee will entail a stronger role for the
federal government."); Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, "Meaningful" Educational Opportunity, and the
Necessary Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1514 (2007) (highlighting areas in which
Congress should have an increased role); Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Case for a Collaborative
Enforcement Model for a Federal Right to Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1653, 1682, 1686 (2007)
(describing a federal right to education).
23. Some go one step further and argue that the Fourteenth Amendment demands that
Congress and courts increase their role in safeguarding education. See, e.g., Derek Black,
Unlocking the Power of State Constitutions with Equal Protection: The First Step Toward
Education as a Federally Protected Right, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343 (2010) (advocating use of
the Equal Protection Clause to challenge disparities in the quality of education); Barry Friedman
& Sara Solow, The Federal Right to an Adequate Education, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 92, 96-97
(2013); Liu, supra note 22, at 334.
24. See, e.g., Alyson Klein, Waivers and ESEA Renewal Get Hard Look From Senators, EDUC.
WEEK, Feb. 7, 2013, http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/2013/02/senators-
take_a_hard lookat_w.html, archived at http://perma.cc/6YK6-4FC3 (describing multiple
opinions about waivers); Benjamin Wood, State School Board Divided on Extending No Child Left
Behind Waiver, DESERET NEWS, July 17, 2014, http://www.deseretnews.com/article/
865607128/State-School-Board-postpones-decision-on-NCLB-waiver.html?pg-all, archived at
http://perma.cc/Q373-9EDB (describing how state officials questioned the Department's authority
one year after having received a waiver). The House Committee on Education and the Workforce
had requested analysis from the Congressional Research Service on the Secretary's overall waiver
power in 2010. See EMILY BARBOUR, ET. AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, SECRETARY OF
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condition federal funds and delegate power to agencies controls the
answer.
David Barron and Todd Rakoffs recent article, "In Defense of
Big Waiver," offered the first thorough analysis of agency power to
impose policy through statutory waivers.2 5 That article, however,
preceded the final evolution of the NCLB waiver process and did not
fully contemplate the issues NCLB waivers have raised-issues that
accentuate the balance of powers at stake between Congress and
agencies, and the federalism tensions between the federal and state
governments. In particular, the NCLB waiver process raises the issue
of whether Congress must articulate a conditional waiver power and
the extent to which Congress must set any limits on the conditions an
agency can impose. As currently written, NCLB lacks explicit language
pertaining to the scope of the waiver power, much less the power to
impose conditions.2 6 Neither scholarship nor judicial opinions directly
address this fundamental problem of allocating conditional waiver
authority between the executive and the legislature.
Against this dearth of literature, this Article reasons that
imposing new conditions through waiver that go beyond the scope of an
organic statute violates the Spending Clause, the nondelegation
doctrine, and the organic statute itself. First, Spending Clause doctrine
requires that Congress clearly articulate all conditions on federal funds
in advance. 27 While there are distinctions between agency conditions
and statutory conditions, post facto imposition of new conditions on
federal funds through waiver violates the clear notice rule embodied in
Spending Clause precedent. NCLB does not suggest, and indeed even
contradicts, the conditions that the Department of Education
ultimately imposed on states.28 In other words, Spending Clause
doctrine restricts agencies' ability to use conditional waiver power to
change the rules of the game in unexpected ways-which is what
Secretary Duncan did.
EDUCATION'S WAIVER AUTHORITY WITH RESPECT TO TITLE I-A PROVISIONS INCLUDED IN THE
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT (2011), available at
http://edworkforce.house.gov/uploadedfiles/june_28_2011 crs.report.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/QM92-C3PG. The Congressional Research Service's analysis, however, was equivocal on
many important issues.
25. Barron & Rakoff, supra note 7, at 277; see also BARBOUR ET AL., supra note 24 (offering
short examination of Secretary's potential waiver authority).
26. 20 U.S.C. § 7861(a) (2012).
27. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
28. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 7371 (stating that the Act does not authorize the Department to
require "specific instructional content, academic achievement standards and assessments,
curriculum, or program of instruction").
2015] 615
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Second, Spending Clause doctrine prohibits Congress from using
federal funds to coerce states, to the point of compulsion, to adopt
federal policies. 29 As Samuel Bagenstos explains, "when Congress takes
an entrenched federal program that provides large sums to the states
and tells states they can continue to participate in that program only if
they also agree to participate in a separate and independent program,"
Congress unconstitutionally coerces states.30 With waivers, an agency
rather than Congress is coercing states, but the same principle applies
insofar as the agency is exercising delegated authority. To continue
receiving NCLB funds and remain compliant, the Secretary required
states to adopt an entirely new set of conditions that fundamentally
transformed the structure and substance of NCLB-one of the more
entrenched federal programs in existence-into an independent
program focused on a nationalized curriculum and teacher
assessments. 31 The funds at stake with NCLB waivers were not as large
as those in the National Federation of Independent Business v.
SebeliuS32-the only case in which the Court has found conditions
unconstitutionally coercive-but NCLB funds and nonmonetary
sanctions have an analogous impact on states and districts. As such,
the Secretary's conditions raise serious questions as to whether he may
have unconstitutionally coerced states.
Third, the Constitution prohibits Congress from delegating its
lawmaking function to agencies. 33 The Court has adopted a permissive
standard to police congressional delegations, requiring only that
Congress articulate an "intelligible principle" to guide agency action.34
This Article argues that, because waivers occur in a much different
context than traditional delegations and are one step further removed
from congressional will, the Court should apply the intelligible principle
standard more rigorously to conditional waivers. But even under the
current liberal approach, a power to condition NCLB waivers as the
Secretary might deem necessary raises constitional concerns because
29. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601 (2012); Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
30. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause After
NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. 861, 865 (2013).
31. See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2663 (plurality opinion) (noting that education spending was
second only to Medicaid in terms of size). See generally Black, supra note 22, at 336-40 (discussing
the fifty-year history of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act and its most recent iteration,
NCLB).
32. 132 S. Ct. 2566. While upholding the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act in
general, seven Justices agreed that the Act's mandatory Medicaid expansion was impermissibly
coercive.
33. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001); Loving v. United States,
517 U.S. 748, 771 (1996).
34. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472.
616 [Vol. 68:3:607
FEDERALIZING EDUCATION BY WAIVER?
such a power would permit the Secretary to impose terms that know no
bounds. Given the nature of education, the Secretary would possess
unilateral power to pursue almost any policy imaginable and eliminate
the democratic processes at the local, state, and, more recently, federal
levels that have always debated and decided these issues. As such, the
delegation would be different in scope and nature than the delegations
previously upheld by the Court.
A court, however, need not even reach the intelligible principle
analysis because NCLB does not explicitly grant the Secretary power to
condition waivers. Thus, the waivers also fail on statutory grounds.
Even if a court inferred that Congress had implicitly granted the
Secretary the authority to impose conditions on NCLB waivers, the
power would not include the authority to condition waivers with terms
that fundamentally alter the underlying legislative framework.35 At
most, waiver power implies an authority to condition waivers with
terms designed to ensure substantial and continued compliance with
the existing legislative framework. Waivers of that sort are more
appropriately understood as partial waivers, not full waivers with new
conditions attached. Moreover, the Supreme Court has increasingly
construed statutes narrowly when the power asserted by an agency
would otherwise push the constitutional bounds of permissible
congressional delegation.36
In sum, the use of conditional waivers to impose new policies is
a significant and powerful innovation. 37 Waivers are far more efficient
than the legislative process. Secretary Duncan used them to effectively
federalize major aspects of education and achieve goals that have
previously eluded other federal actors. For that reason, their appeal is
likely to grow in other areas of federal regulation. 38 This growth,
however, must be tempered by constitutional principles that require
that states receive advance notice of the power and its scope. The
conditions recently imposed on our nation's schools transgress those
principles.
Part II of this Article identifies the controlling constitutional
precedent regarding congressional conditions on federal funds and
delegations of authority to agencies. This Part also provides the
statutory analysis necessary to apply those doctrines. Part III then
35. See id. at 468 (explaining that Congress does not grant agencies vast power to alter core
statutory premises in less-than-obvious language).
36. See Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023,
2027 (2008).
37. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 7, at 270-71.
38. See id.
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applies that constitutional precedent and statutory analysis to
conditional waivers, concluding that Congress cannot grant, and courts
cannot reasonably infer, an open-ended authority to condition waivers
that would permit an agency official to impose conditions beyond the
scope of the underlying statute. To permit an agency to impose
conditions that do anything more than ensure substantial compliance
with the existing statutory framework, Congress must explicitly grant
the authority to condition waivers and delineate the scope of
permissible conditions. Part IV develops the relevant history that
preceded the NCLB waivers, revealing that the waiver conditions had
been part of the Administration's legislative policy reform agenda for
three years and were not designed to further compliance with NCLB.
To the contrary, they were designed to fundamentally alter education
policy. Part V considers the constitutionality of these particular
conditions in light of the underlying statutory text in NCLB, finding
that states lacked sufficient notice of these conditions and an
opportunity to reject them. In addition, the Secretary exceeded his
statutory authority. The conditions were so broad that Congress may
have been unable, within constitutional bounds, to extend the Secretary
the necessary power, even had it wanted to. This Article concludes by
considering the wider effects and implications the power to condition
waivers will have on the various disputes currently proceeding through
courts, Congress, and state legislatures.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF WAIVER CONDITIONS IN
FEDERALLY FUNDED PROGRAMS
NCLB waivers implicate two major constitutional constraints:
the limits on Congress's spending power and the limits on Congress's
ability to delegate lawmaking authority to administrative agencies.
Spending power limits are relevant because NCLB is a federal spending
program that grants the Secretary of Education power to terminate
federal funds and impose sanctions on those states and districts that
are in violation of NCLB's requirements. The statute also grants the
Secretary the option to waive those requirements. Congress, no doubt,
can extend these powers to the Secretary without violating the
Spending Clause, but when the Secretary imposes new conditions in
exchange for waivers, the new conditions implicate Spending Clause
limits that (a) require clear and advance notice of conditions and (b)
prohibit coercive conditions that amount to compulsion.
Administrative and constitutional questions also arise as to
whether the Secretary has been or can be granted the power to impose
conditions in exchange for waivers. First, the Secretary can only
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exercise those powers conveyed to him by Congress. Thus, the statutory
text of NCLB must either explicitly grant the Secretary power to impose
conditions or contain language that implies such a power. Otherwise,
conditioning waivers would be beyond the scope of the Secretary's
authority. Second, if the authority to condition does exist, the authority
to condition is not open-ended. The scope of permissible conditions
would be limited explicitly by statutory text or implicitly by the overall
scope of the statute. Third, the Constitution prohibits Congress from
implicitly or explicitly delegating certain powers to the executive,
namely legislative powers. A waiver power that did not include precise
limits on the Secretary's authority to condition waivers would reach the
outer boundaries of Congress's delegation authority, if not cross over
them. To avoid striking down broad delegations on constitutional
grounds, the Court has increasingly narrowly construed statutory texts
and found agencies' action beyond the scope of their authority. In other
words, a delegation of questionable constitutionality makes it even
more likely that a court would find that an agency has exercised power
beyond the scope of the underlying statute. Under either of these
approaches-spending or delegation-conditional NCLB waivers, as
currently exercised, place an enormous amount of coercive power in the
hands of the Secretary and upset the balance of power between the
states and the federal government in a way not intended by Congress
or permitted by the Constitution. The following sections address each
of these doctrines in turn.
A. Spending Clause Restraints: Unambiguous Conditions
and Coercion
The Court announced its five-pronged standard for assessing the
constitutionality of conditions on federal funds in South Dakota v.
Dole.39 First, the Congressional spending must "provide for
the . . . general Welfare." 40 Second, if Congress intends to condition
federal funds, "it 'must do so unambiguously. . . , enabl[ing] the States
to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of
their participation.' "41 Third, the conditions must be related "to the
federal interest in particular national projects or programs." 42 Fourth,
39. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
41. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1,
17 (1981)).
42. Id. at 207-08 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)
(plurality opinion)).
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the conditions must not violate any other constitutional provision. 43
Fifth, while Congress is free to incentivize or coerce states to adopt
policies that they might not otherwise adopt, Congress cannot use
financial inducement and the conditions accompanying the funds to
exert so much coercive pressure that it turns into "compulsion." 4 4
As a practical matter, the Dole standard has imposed almost no
restraint on Congressional spending. The Court completely defers to
Congress on the issue of whether expenditures are for the general
welfare. The Court has been nearly as deferential on whether conditions
on the funds are related to the federal interest. In Dole, the Court found
that Congress could withhold federal highway funds from states that
permitted individuals under the age of twenty-one to purchase
alcohol. 45 The Court reasoned that this condition on federal funds was
related to Congress's interest in highway construction because drinking
and driving creates a safety hazard on those highways. 46 The dissent
argued that Congress's interest was not in highway construction but in
liquor sales and that, by the majority's reasoning, Congress could
require a state to move its capital next to the interstate because
"transportation is facilitated by locating local governments in places
easily accessible to interstate highways-or, conversely, that highways
might become overburdened if they had to carry traffic to and from the
state capital."4 7 In short, the relatedness prong has proven very
permissive.
If Dole imposes any enforceable limitation, it is that the
conditions, whatever they may be, must be unambiguous. For Congress,
this requirement is no more than a legislative drafting guide: Congress
may impose any related conditions it wishes, so long as it is clear when
it does so. But for agencies and litigants, this principle prevents them
from reading new or more stringent conditions into statutes. States may
be bound by almost any condition that Congress might explicitly
impose, but courts will overturn agency actions and reject private party
claims when states had no notice of, nor could have reasonably
anticipated, the underlying term or condition upon which the agency or
litigant relies.
For instance, the Court in Arlington Central School District
Board of Education v. Murphy48 addressed whether prevailing
43. Id. at 208.
44. Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
45. Id. at 208-09.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 215 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
48. 548 U.S. 291 (2006).
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plaintiffs could recover expert fees from schools under the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"). The Court framed the
question as whether, when it accepted federal funds, the state would
have "clearly underst[oo]d" that expert fees fell within IDEA's fee-
shifting provision. 49 The Court found that, even if one could reasonably
interpret expert fees to fall within the meaning of "fees," the statute did
not put states on clear notice of liability for expert fees.50 Thus,
reimbursing expert fees is not a condition of receiving federal funds
under the IDEA. Congress remains free to explicitly include expert fees
as a condition in the future, but neither agencies nor courts can do so of
their own accord. This principle has come to be known simply as the
"clear notice" rule,5 ' and lower courts have further built upon it,
indicating that Congress must put states on clear notice not only of the
conditions but also of the consequences of breaching the conditions. 52
The final Dole prong-coercion-provides a theoretical limit on
congressional and agency action, but in practice it has been difficult to
define and apply. States routinely claim federal spending programs are
coercive, but until 2012 they had never succeeded on the merits.5 3
Samuel Bagenstos reasons that the difficulty in applying the Court's
coercion doctrine is that there is no baseline against which to measure
coercive action.5 4 All spending legislation is coercive, and that is its
point. Congress gives states money to do things they would not
otherwise do. But because coercion is relative, there is no exact point at
which coercion becomes impermissible compulsion. For instance, a state
might claim it was forced to take on federal obligations it substantively
objected to because it was in dire financial straits. The federal response
would be that it offered a deal sufficiently enticing that it offset the
state's policy concerns. In other words, the state liked the money more
than it disliked the policy. This does not amount to compulsion. One's
sense of which party is correct depends, in large part, on perception.
Current doctrine has offered no analysis by which to objectify the
competing claims of states and Congress.
49. Id. at 296.
50. Id. at 300-04.
51. See generally Nicole Huberfeld, Clear Notice for Conditions on Spending, Unclear
Implications for States in Federal Healthcare Programs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 441 (2008) (analyzing thQ
evolution of the notice standards required in Spending Clause jurisprudence).
52. See, e.g., West Virginia v. United States, 289 F.3d 281, 292 (4th Cir. 2002); Virginia Dep't
of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 579 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
53. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603-04 (2012) (plurality opinion).
54. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts Court, 58 DUKE L.J.
345, 372-84 (2008).
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In 2012, in National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius, the Court for the first time struck down spending legislation
as impermissibly coercive, but the decision failed to offer a
straightforward analysis of when coercion becomes compulsion.55 The
most direct statement was that the Affordable Care Act's conditions on
expanding Medicaid amounted to a "gun to the head."5 6 This vivid
characterization, however, is no more of an applicable doctrinal
standard than the terms coercion and compulsion. Scholars have since
parsed the determinative factors of the Sebelius analysis to provide
some clarity. Bagenstos discerns what he terms an antileveraging
principle in Sebelius: "[W]hen Congress takes an entrenched federal
program that provides large sums to the states and tells states they can
continue to participate in that program only if they also agree to
participate in a separate and independent program, the condition is
unconstitutionally coercive."57
He breaks the antileveraging principle into three analytical
steps. First, the controlling opinion "draws a distinction between
conditions that govern the use of the funding Congress offers and
conditions that threaten to terminate other significant independent
grants."58 If Congress has not threatened an independent grant, the
program passes constitutional muster. Second, if Congress threatens an
independent program, the question becomes "whether the condition at
issue leaves states a real choice, 'not merely in theory but in fact.' "59
Here, the amount of money is crucial. When little money is at stake,
states have a real choice. 60 Third, when a relatively large sum of money
is a stake, the nature and history of the federal program is relevant. In
Sebelius, the Court "found it significant that the new conditions were
attached to continued participation in an entrenched and lucrative
cooperative program."61 The "independent program" in Sebelius was the
newly amended version of Medicaid. There, the Court reasoned that the
amended version was an independent program, rather than merely a
continuation of the old program. According to Bagenstos, the Court
came to this conclusion because the law
55. 132 S. Ct. at 2601-08 (plurality opinion). The plurality section of the opinion is consistent
with the position of the four dissenting justices. See id. at 2656-68 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito, JJ., dissenting).
56. Id. at 2604.
57. Bagenstos, supra note 30, at 865.
58. Id. at 870-71.
59. Id. at 871 (quoting Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (plurality opinion)).
60. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1987) (reasoning that the loss of
five percent of highway grants was a "relatively mild encouragement").
61. Bagenstos, supra note 30, at 871.
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changed-in what seemed to be a fundamental way-the terms by which states could
continue to participate in the ongoing Medicaid program. The Chief Justice emphasized
that Congress was not threatening to shut off the spigot for failure to comply with new
obligations within the general scope of the preexisting Medicaid program. Rather, the new
conditions effected a "shift in kind, not merely degree," transforming Medicaid's federal-
state contract from "a program to care for the neediest among us" to "an element of a
comprehensive national plan to provide universal health insurance coverage."6 2
The Medicaid expansion was unconstitutionally coercive only because
all three factors converged: (1) the Affordable Care Act was not simply
an expansion of the existing Medicaid program but a distinct and
independent program; (2) a huge amount of money was at stake; and
(3) remaining eligible for the old entrenched Medicaid program required
states to join the new one.
Eloise Pasachoff concurs in Bagenstos's analysis, although she
articulates a slightly differently worded framework. 63 Her framework
hints at an important connection between coercion analysis and the
unambiguous conditions standard. She correctly points out that the
Court's opinion in Sebelius emphasized that the lack of notice that the
program would later transform into something different added to the
coercion. From this, one might reason that all conditions must be clearly
stated to pass the unambiguous conditions standard. And, to survive
coercion analysis, the possibility that those conditions might be
changed in the future must also be clearly stated in advance (if those
changes threaten huge sums of money and work transformative
changes to entrenched programs). Thus, the only hard rule in Spending
Clause doctrine-unambiguous conditions-may now drive coercion
doctrine as well. After all, had the states been on sufficient notice of the
conditions, the states' claim of coercion would have failed, regardless of
the substance of the conditions. 64 As subsequent sections discuss in
62. Id. at 881-82 (quoting Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2605-06 (plurality opinion)).
63. Eloise Pasachoff, Conditional Spending After NFIB v. Sebelius: The Example of Federal
Education Law, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 577, 583 (2013) (providing a three-step coercion analysis that
starts with evaluating whether "the condition in question threaten[s] to take away funds for a
program that is separate and independent from the program to which the condition in question is
attached.").
64. A lingering question is why the Court finally intervened on coercion grounds in this
particular case. Nothing in prior Spending Clause doctrine would have suggested that the
Affordable Care Act was unconstitutionally coercive. Professors Bagenstos and Pasachoff reason
that this new coercion doctrine is motivated by Tenth Amendment concerns over the federal
government commandeering states and upsetting traditional federalism boundaries, which, prior
to Sebelius, had arisen solely in Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment cases. Some
scholars had urged the Court to import those analyses into the Spending Clause, but because
states were voluntarily conceding to federal leadership through spending programs, Tenth
Amendment concerns seemed inapplicable. The Court in Sebelius was careful not to hinge its
holding on the Tenth Amendment but clearly wrapped its coercion analysis within a similar set of
concerns. It reasoned that the need to respect states as "independent sovereigns in our federal
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detail, Secretary Duncan's use of his waiver power implicates both the
clear notice and coercion doctrines.
B. Separation of Powers Restraints: Nondelegation and
Statutory Authority
When Congress leaves agencies to further define and interpret
statutes, questions arise as to whether Congress has run afoul of the
constitutional structure of separation of powers between the branches
of government. In particular, the Constitution prohibits Congress from
delegating its legislative power to the executive or changing the process
by which legislation is enacted. 65 As a practical matter, however, the
executive necessarily exercises judgment and discretion in carrying out
legislation, and Congress often specifically directs agencies to use that
judgment and discretion to fill in the gaps in legislative text. The line
between permissible and impermissible delegations is whether
Congress has articulated a meaningful principle by which an agency
must act or has left the agency to act with complete discretion. As the
Court stated in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations,66 "[W]hen
Congress confers decision making authority upon agencies Congress
must 'lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the
person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform.' "67 Moreover,
an agency cannot "cure an unlawful delegation of legislative power by
adopting in its discretion a limiting construction of the statute."68
The Court's nondelegation doctrine originates from two Lochner
Era cases in which the Court struck down portions of the National
Industrial Recovery Act. In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,69 Congress
had authorized the President to prohibit the interstate and foreign
transportation of petroleum but had not articulated any standard or
system" and to prevent the centralization of all power in the federal government justified its
coercion analysis. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2602 (plurality opinion); see also at 2656-68 (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (articulating a position consistent with the plurality
opinion). Moreover, according to the Court, voters would "not understand which government
officials-federal or state-to blame for a particular program" and political accountability would
suffer unless the Court intervened. Pasachoff, supra note 63, at 592; see also Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 919-21 (1997) (discussing the merits of the federal system and emphasizing
the importance of the accountability of the states to the citizenry); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992) (discussing the problems of reduced political accountability when the
citizenry are not sure which level of government to blame for a certain policy).
65. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001); Clinton v. New York,
524 U.S. 417 (1998).
66. 531 U.S. 457.
67. Id. at 472 (quoting Hampton v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).
68. Id.
69. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
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conditions under which the executive would decide to exercise this
authority.70 The Act effectively granted the executive a blank check to
limit and punish petroleum transfers as it saw fit. The Court held that
the absence of a standard to limit the executive's exercise of discretion
was an impermissible delegation of legislative power.
In the other case, A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States,71 Congress had granted the President the power "to approve
'codes of fair competition' " for trades and industries. 72 The only
substantive limitation on the codes was that they could not promote
monopolies or oppress small enterprises. 73 The Court reasoned that the
phrase "unfair methods of competition" lacks a precise or set
definition.74 Rather, the meaning of the phrase depends on the way in
which competition is occurring in a given context and one's sense of
what the public interest would be in that context.75 By leaving these
crucial issues to the judgment of trade associations and/or the
President, the Court concluded that Congress had unconstitutionally
delegated its lawmaking function. The Court explained that the
Constitution allows Congress the necessary flexibility to lay down
general policies and standards, within which others will make
subordinate rules and adapt "legislation to complex conditions
involving a host of details with which the national Legislature cannot
deal directly."76 But it does not permit Congress "to abdicate or to
transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it is
thus vested." 7
70. Id. at 415:
It does not attempt to control the production of petroleum and petroleum products
within a state. It does not seek to lay down rules for the guidance of state Legislatures
or state officers. It leaves to the states and to their constituted authorities the
determination of what production shall be permitted. It does not qualify the President's
authority by reference to the basis or extent of the state's limitation of production.
Section 9(c) does not state whether or in what circumstances or under what conditions
the President is to prohibit the transportation of the amount of petroleum or petroleum
products produced in excess of the state's permission. It establishes no criterion to
govern the President's course. It does not require any finding by the President as a
condition of his action. The Congress in section 9(c) thus declares no policy as to the
transportation of the excess production. So far as this section is concerned, it gives to
the President an unlimited authority to determine the policy and to lay down the
prohibition, or not to lay it down, as he may see fit. And disobedience to his order is
made a crime punishable by fine and imprisonment.
71. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
72. Id. at 521-22 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 703 (1933)).
73. Id. at 522-23.
74 Id.
75. Id. at 532-33.
76. Id. at 529-30.
77. Id. at 529.
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Since Panama and Schechter, the Court has not struck down a
single Congressional grant of power to the executive as violating the
nondelegation doctrine.78 This trend is significant given that
Congressional grants of power to the executive have grown broader, not
narrower, over the past eighty years. 79 The Court's recent decisions,
however, show the interplay between nondelegation doctrine and
statutory techniques for narrowing delegations, with the Court
increasingly striking down agency actions on statutory grounds. In
other words, the Court remains concerned with broad delegations but
prefers to address them on statutory grounds.
In 2001, in Whitman, plaintiffs challenged the Environmental
Protection Agency's power to set air quality standards to promote public
health and the agency's decision to consider cost in setting those
standards.80 Plaintiffs charged that the statutory language directing
the EPA to "establish uniform national standards at a level that is
requisite to protect public health from the adverse effects of the
pollutant in the ambient air" violated the Court's intelligible principle
doctrine.81 Because public health operates across a spectrum and there
is no point at which one can precisely say some level of air quality is
requisite, the agency was given authority to adopt almost any standards
it saw fit.82 While plaintiffs' factual assertion about the spectrum of air
quality is true, the Court reasoned that this fact did not rob the statute
of an intelligible principle. The Court wrote that "a certain degree of
discretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most executive or judicial
action." 83 Congress directed the EPA to protect health and adopt
standards with an "an adequate margin of safety." 84 That the agency
would need to exercise its judgment in adopting the precise level did not
mean Congress had abdicated its lawmaking function to the agency.
The Court's permissiveness on constitutional doctrine was
balanced by its stricter statutory analysis of what the EPA could
consider in adopting standards. The Court found that the EPA had
exceeded the statutory discretion delegated to it when it considered
78. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) ("In the history of the
Court we have found the requisite 'intelligible principle' lacking in only two statutes . . . .").
79. See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation
Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399 (2000) (arguing that the Supreme Court's
"New Delegation Doctrine" permits Congress to delegate broadly but requires agencies themselves
to create standards limiting their own authority under those delegations).
80. See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 462-64.
81. Id. at 464, 473.
82. Id. at 474-76.
83. Id. at 475 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 417 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis omitted)).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012).
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economic costs in adopting standards. The relevant statute "instructs
the EPA to set primary ambient air quality standards 'the attainment
and maintenance of which ... are requisite to protect the public health'
with 'an adequate margin of safety.' . . . Nowhere are the costs of
achieving such a standard made part of that initial calculation." 5 The
Court allowed that "the terms 'adequate margin' and 'requisite'
[arguably] leave room to pad health effects with cost concerns," but it is
highly unlikely, if not implausible, that Congress would make such an
important criteria for assessing public health effects so subtle.86
"Congress . . . does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory
scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions-it does not, one might
say, hide elephants in mouseholes."8 7 To claim a grant of crucial
authority at the center of legislation, an agency must be able to point to
a "clear" textual commitment of that authority.88 Otherwise, the power
is beyond the scope of agency authority.
The Court has increasingly taken similar approaches in other
cases where the grant of authority an agency claims, if validated, might
present serious nondelegation concerns.89 These delegation and
statutory scope decisions collectively reveal an extremely permissive
application of the intelligible principle standard, making it hard to
project circumstances under which a delegation would be so vague that
the Court could not uphold it. But these cases also reveal the Court's
serious concern with broad delegations and a willingness to identify
statutory bases to narrow and strike down agency authority.
Gillian Metzger finds that this narrowing is particularly
prevalent in cases implicating federalism concerns. She writes, "[T]he
Court has demonstrated an unwillingness to impose significant
constitutional limits on the substantive scope of Congress's regulatory
powers," but it has raised "federalism concerns about protecting the
states' independent regulatory role" and policed that balance through
85. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 465 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1)).
86. Id. at 468.
87. Id.; see, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 529 U.S. 120, 159-60 (2000); MCI
Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994).
88. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 468.
89. See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (plurality opinion) (rejecting the
Army Corps of Engineers' broad definition of "navigable waters" under the Clean Water Act);
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (holding that the Controlled Substances Act, requiring
registration with the Attorney General to dispense controlled substances, did not authorize the
Attorney General to decide what constituted "legitimate medical practice" under the Act). But see
Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007) (holding that the National Banking Act's grant
of powers incidental to banking, including conducting certain activities via operating subsidiaries,
preempted state regulations that would otherwise apply to such subsidiaries).
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statutory scope and administrative law.90 When federal regulation has
substantially impacted states, the Court has curbed Congressional
delegations and agency interpretations by "requiring clear
authorization for federal agency action."91 Thus, she concludes that
strict statutory analysis and administrative law doctrines are
"becoming the home of a new federalism." 92 Many others also point out
that restraining agencies in these cases is particularly important
because, even if agencies are experts in their given substantive fields of
environment, health or education, 93 they are not experts in
constitutional values and governmental structures.94 Moreover,
agencies' confidence in their substantive policies may make them the
most likely of all to encroach on other branches' powers. 95
C. Constitutional Dangers of Waiver Conditions
Case law addressing general statutory waivers is
underdeveloped and nonexistent as to conditional waivers. In those few
decisions analyzing waiver power, courts have refrained from
addressing the key constitutional issues this Article raises. Instead,
courts have focused on standing and whether the agency decision was
even reviewable. 96 Waivers have generated little case law because those
90. Metzger, supra note 36, at 2027.
91. Id. at 2047.
92. Id. at 2027.
93. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (noting
that the "decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute" frequently requires "a full understanding
of the force of the statutory policy in the given situation," which "depend[s] upon more than
ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations" (quoting United
States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382 (1961)); see also David F. Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between
Chevron and Pennhurst: A Functional Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the
Administrative State, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1197, 1211-12 ("[T]he values [Chevron] promotes are
straightforward and include deference to agency expertise, which is assumed to be greater than
that of judges.").
94. See, e.g., Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law's Federalism: Preemption,
Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1922, 1948-84 (2008); Nina
A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 779-94 (2004); Thomas W. Merrill,
Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 727, 749-50 (2008). See generally NEIL
K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAw, ECONOMICS, AND
PUBLIC POLICY (1994) (emphasizing the need to assess institutional competence in comparative
perspective).
95. See, e.g., Damien J. Marshall, Note, The Application of Chevron Deference in Regulatory
Preemption Cases, 87 GEO. L.J. 263, 279 (1998) (discussing how Chevron deference may undermine
the Rice presumption).
96. See, e.g., Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1064-67 (9th Cir. 1994); Connecticut v. Spellings,
453 F. Supp. 2d 459, 464-65 (D. Conn. 2006); C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. 991, 1001-04 (D.N.J.
1995); Complaint, Nat'l Ass'n of Cmty. Health Ctrs. v. Shalala, No. 1:94-CV01238 (D.D.C. June 7,
1994); see also Recent Case, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1208 (1995) (discussing how judicial review of the
FEDERALIZING EDUCATION BY WAIVER?
receiving them have little incentive to challenge them-even if they
dislike the terms-and everyone else faces standing problems.97 David
Barron and Todd Rakoff offer the only thorough analysis of waivers.
They distinguish between "little waiver" and "big waiver." 98 "Little
waiver" has existed for some time and is common.99 Little waivers,
however, were designed to deal with exceptional cases that Congress
could not have foreseen or those where enforcing a statute might
impede other congressional goals. 00 Big waiver is not the power to deal
with the extraordinary case but the power to waive a major aspect of
legislation for an entire class of regulated entities. 101 It is the power to
"undo what Congress has done" and potentially remake the law through
regulations or conditions on the waiver. 102
Barron and Rakoff primarily resolve the question of whether
Congress can extend agencies waiver power, including the power to
condition the waiver. They persuasively demonstrate that Congress can
give agencies waiver power and the authority to condition them,
pointing out that (a) waiver power does not violate the Presentment
Clause in the way that a presidential line-item veto does; 103 (b) waiver
is more akin to nonenforcement of the law than a veto of law; 10 4 and
(c) conditional waiver power that permits agencies to remake the law is
no more of a delegation violation than broad congressional delegations
that authorize agencies to interpret the law and pass regulations on the
front end. 105
welfare waiver process safeguards the rights of welfare recipients by checking administrative
agency authority and how Beno has increased public participation).
97. See Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 482-89; Anthony Consiglio, Comment, Nervous
Laughter and the High Cost of Equality: Renewing "No Child Left Behind" Will Safeguard a
Vibrant Federalism and a Path Toward Educational Excellence, 2009 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 365,
370; Second Amended Complaint at IT 104-06, 114, 117-26, 133-36, 143-59, Connecticut v.
Spellings, 549 F. Supp. 2d 161 (D. Conn. 2008) (No. 3:05CV1330), 2005 WL 4748348. Even were
standing not a problem, the Administrative Procedure Act precludes review of discretionary acts.
5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2012). Thus, the merits of the Secretary's decision are generally beyond
challenge. To make out a claim, a plaintiff would probably have to attack the process and show
that the Secretary considered or excluded from consideration factors that the controlling statute
mandated or excluded.
98. Barron & Rakoff, supra note 7, at 271.
99. See, e.g., Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 ("COBRA') § 10001(c),
Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 222, 223 (1986) (codified at I.R.C. § 162 (2012)).
100. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 7, at 276-77.
101. See id. at 267-71, 277-90.
102. Id. at 267, 269-70.
103. See id. at 275, 313-14.
104. See id. at 272-74.
105. See id. at 266-69.
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That Congress can constitutionally extend waiver and condition
power to agencies, however, does not resolve the more complex question
of what, if any, limits might exist on the scope of the power that
Congress might delegate or agencies might exercise. Once an agency
exercises conditional waiver power in its broadest form-which Barron
and Rakoff assume an agency can-another set of key spending,
delegation, and scope problems arise that Barron and Rakoff do not
fully consider.
1. Insufficient Notice of Waiver Conditions
Big waiver power implicates both the notice and coercion prongs
of South Dakota v. Dole. In general, Congress can always cure notice
problems by stating its conditions unambiguously. A clearly stated
waiver poses no problem because it puts states on notice. One might
even argue that states need not have notice of waiver power under
spending doctrine because a waiver is not a condition. Rather, waiver
power gives the secretary authority to eliminate conditions that
Congress previously imposed on the state. While that may be true,
when an agency imposes new conditions on states through its waiver
power, notice problems can rise to the fore. In the absence of statutory
criteria governing the conditions that the secretary might place on
waivers or where the secretary imposes a condition beyond the scope of
the statutory criteria, states may be deprived of the notice required by
Dole.
The predicate question, however, is whether the clear statement
rule even applies to conditions on waivers. One might argue, along the
following lines, that it does not. States only encounter additional
conditions through waiver as a result of violating some statutory
condition of which they were on full notice, or by asking for advance
permission to develop a state-specific program that goes beyond the
scope of the controlling statute. In either event, states are not entitled
to a waiver and, thus, not entitled to advance notice either. Rather,
states are asking for a statutory variance, which justifies variance of
the conditions in exchange. Neither states nor Congress could have
anticipated all of the circumstances that might necessitate a waiver,
which is why Congress specifically included the provision and why the
agency is not taking advantage of the state in a way that requires
advance notice through the clear statement rule. At worst, the statute
puts states on notice that, if they violate the statute, they may apply for
a waiver, which is granted in the secretary's discretion and, by virtue of
that discretion, may include new conditions.
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This argument attempts to transform waiver "conditions" into
"consequences" that occur at the point of a statutory violation, or an
impending violation. But framing waiver conditions as consequences
does not eliminate notice requirements. Courts have held that must
Congress place states on notice of not only the conditions of accepting
federal funds but also the consequences of violating those conditions. 0 6
A condition might be clearly spelled out, but if the state lacks knowledge
of the specific consequences of breach, courts have enjoined those
consequences. 107 Thus, a statute that clearly provides for waivers and
the possibility of conditions on waivers but does not specify what those
conditions might be or place limits on the conditions fails to give the
state clear and unambiguous notice of the consequences it may suffer.
It leaves the secretary free to impose the conditions as he sees fit, which
deprives states of the clear notice required by Dole and its progeny.
In the alternative, one might defend waiver conditions by
arguing that even if clear notice applies to waiver conditions, it ought
not to apply in the same way that it does to statutory conditions because
agencies do not preemptively impose new conditions through waivers.
States only become subject to additional conditions when they apply for
waivers. At that point, states receive notice of the new conditions and
voluntarily accept them. Thus, in the context of the waiver process,
states do receive clear notice of conditions before they become subject to
them.108 In other words, this notice is the functional equivalent of the
notice a statute might provide and could be treated as such by the law.
The foregoing argument, however, disregards congressional
notice, which is more important. When Congress gives an agency waiver
power and the implicit or explicit authority to condition waivers,
Congress is giving states notice that they will have no notice of the
conditions. That type of notice is insufficient to meet the clear
statement rule. Advance notice of future nonnotice is not equivalent to
clear notice of unambiguous conditions at the time the state agreed to
participate in a federal program. Advance notice of future nonnotice is
the opposite of clear notice and the Court's objectives in Dole. A statute
would be telling states that the conditions of taking federal dollars are
potentially limitless if circumstances change or compliance becomes
infeasible or undesirable. Courts have held that statutory notices that
106. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
107. See, e.g., Terry Jean Seligmann, Muddy Waters: The Supreme Court and the Clear
Statement Rule for Spending Clause Legislation, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1067, 1117 (2010).
108. See, e.g., Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 181 (2005); Davis v. Monroe
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 639 (1999); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274,
288 (1998).
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only give states the ability to vaguely anticipate future conditions are
insufficient to meet the unambiguous conditions requirement. 109
Big waivers that include broad conditions only accentuate the
foregoing problems of insufficient or vague notice. Were waivers
reserved only for the exceptional circumstance-i.e., for those few states
that fail to meet statutory requirements for unique and legitimate
reasons-and the conditions imposed were limited to the scope of initial
statutory conditions, conditional waivers, even if not fully articulated
in advance, might escape problems under the clear statement rule.
Those waivers are exceptional and, thus, might warrant an exception
to general notice requirements. But where Congress has enacted a
detailed regulatory structure that later proves unworkable and requires
mass waivers, it creates a legislative structure that affords an agency
an open-ended license to rewrite the law through waiver conditions in
ways that states could not have anticipated, much less have had
unambiguous knowledge of.110
In sum, while one could make a plausible argument that
conditional waivers fall in a grey area of clear notice requirements, the
sound argument, based on precedent and the manner in which waivers
function, is that the controlling statute must provide states with clear
and unambiguous notice of the terms of the conditions and
consequences. If conditions on waivers are treated as a condition on
funding, states lack notice of those conditions when an agency is free to
set them as it sees fit. If conditions on waivers are consequences of a
violation, states still have no notice of those consequences. The only way
to avoid notice problems is to reason that states are not entitled to
notice because they are not entitled to waivers. But this line of
reasoning misses the point. This reasoning is premised on the general
rule that the substantive judgment of whether to grant a waiver is
unreviewable because it involves a discretionary act,11 ' but that the
substantive decision falls within agency discretion is irrelevant to
whether an agency followed the correct process or considered statutorily
required factors. Spending Clause notice requirements speak to
109. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 ("[I]f Congress intends
to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously."); Bagenstos,
supra note 30, at 887.
110. This problem does arise when agencies regulate pursuant to the Commerce Clause
because states are not entering into a voluntary and contractual relationship with the federal
government. Rather, they are subject to regulation by virtue of the federal government's explicit
and inherently unilateral authority over areas affecting interstate commerce. The question in
those cases is one of agency authority to act, not notice. This distinction is crucial and not always
fully accounted for because so many challenges to agency action arise in regard to Commerce
Clause regulation.
111. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2012).
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process, not substance. Likewise, that an agency exercised discretion in
awarding waivers does not answer the question of whether the agency
went beyond the scope of its discretionary power. 112 Conditional waivers
that impose conditions beyond the scope of the organic statute, or
conditions that fall within the scope of agency authority but which
states cannot reasonably anticipate, do not satisfy Spending Clause
notice requirements. The Spending Clause requires specific statutory
language that places states on notice of the terms to which they will be
subject.
2. Leverage and Surprise at the Point of Waiver
Waivers, particularly those negotiated in context of an imminent
statutory violation, afford agencies significant leverage against a
state-far more than an agency would have had when the state first
agreed to participate in the program. This leverage offers the
opportunity for an agency to impose conditions of which a state might
have had no notice, raising the possibility of impermissible coercion.
Not all waivers, however, raise serious coercion concerns. To breach
Sebelius's antileveraging approach, the waiver would need to jeopardize
a large sum of money in an entrenched program-so that the state has
no real choice but to accept the conditions-and the waiver would have
to impose new obligations that effectively transform the underlying
program into a separate and independent program. 113
The average waiver is unlikely to be impermissibly coercive
under Sebelius because the funds at stake are too small or, even if they
are more significant, the conditions do not transform the original
program into a new independent program. Bagenstos postulated that,
under certain circumstances, the availability of waivers might work to
the advantage of states.11 4 Because Sebelius made claims of coercion
viable, he suggested that states would be able to extract waivers from
an administration wary of defending its more aggressive funding
conditions, such as those in NCLB.11 5 In other words, waiver provisions
would allow states to coerce the federal government.
112. See, e.g., Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1066 (9th Cir. 1994) (confirming the statute
granted considerable discretion to the agency but still proceeding to review the use of that
discretion).
113. Bagenstos, supra note 30, at 865; Pasachoff, supra note 63, at 594-95.
114. See Bagenstos, supra note 30, at 907-O8 (discussing how the Sebelius decision may give
states more power to pick and choose which conditions on federal funds to comply with); Samuel
R. Bagenstos, Federalism By Waiver After the Health Care Case, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE
SUPREME COURT'S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 227 (Gillian Metzger et al. eds., 2013).
115. See Bagenstos, supra note 30, at 907-O8, 911-12.
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This reasoning, however, proceeds on two questionable
assumptions: (1) that there were regulatory statutes for which a
reasonable claim of coercion can be made and (2) that the
Administration was more wary of courts than it was of inviting and
granting an avalanche of waiver requests that would undermine its
ability to enforce old policy or impose new policy through the
administrative process. The dissent in Sebelius suggested that NCLB
might be one of the closest analogs to the Affordable Care Act and, thus,
might come under attack, 1 16 but Professor Pasachoff convincingly
demonstrated shortly thereafter that NCLB, nonetheless, would pass
the Sebelius coercion analysis.117 If NCLB is not unconstitutionally
coercive, it is unlikely many, if any, other statutory programs are. In
short, the Affordable Care Act may have been a one-of-a-kind statute in
terms of coercion.
Bagenstos may have been correct that the Administration was
generally wary of constitutional challenges, but the notion that the cost
of freely granting waivers greatly outweighs the relatively small risk of
a state making a colorable coercion claim is incorrect. In any event, the
risk could be confronted when it arose rather than preemptively. 118 The
most effective strategy for warding off colorable claims may have been
for the Administration to stand its ground, even in the face of strong
claims. As Brigham Daniels explains, the "administrative nuke" of fund
termination only works if a state believes the agency will use it. 119 If
the state perceives uncertainty, it only becomes more likely to launch
challenges or engage in further noncompliance. 120
All of this is simply to say that waivers are neither per se
coercive nor per se noncoercive. Context and relative positioning power
matter immensely, which is why the Court's coercion analysis has
eluded clear doctrinal articulation for so long. Most waiver provisions
are not coercive. A number of federal entitlement and antipoverty
programs are entrenched, dating back to the War on Poverty in the
116. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2662-64 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito, JJ., dissenting) (discussing the level of coercion present in the Affordable Care Act).
117. See Pasachoff, supra note 63, at 629.
118. After having been denied a waiver in the fall of 2014, Florida explicitly challenged the
administration's authority in regard to waivers and requested a hearing before an administrative
law judge, relying in part on the analysis in this article. Letter from Governor Rick Scott, supra
note 6.
119. Brigham Daniels, When Agencies Go Nuclear: A Game Theoretic Approach to the Biggest
Sticks in an Agency's Arsenal, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 442, 474 (2012).
120. See id. at 475-76, 490, 497-98.
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1960s or the Great Depression, 121 and the funds that flow through them
are large.1 2 2 But to be overly coercive, Sebelius indicates they must also
impose some new, unexpected conditions that are different in kind, not
just in degree.123 This requirement precludes a viable challenge of the
run-of-the-mill waiver because it does not impose new conditions. Even
those that impose conditions would presumably be aimed at moving a
state toward compliance with the existing statutory requirements.
Thus, those conditions would not transform the program in kind.
Under certain circumstances, however, a waiver could violate
Sebelius's antileveraging approach to coercion. The paradigmatic
leveraging case would arise not out of the statutory terms of the
program, but from the way in which the agency exercises a waiver of
that program. Assuming the funds and entrenchment are significant,
Sebelius-style coercion might arise in two contexts: (1) the statutory
waiver language sets no meaningful substantive limits on the
conditions that the secretary might impose and the agency grants
waivers only based on conditions that go outside of the scope of the
statutory framework, either in substance or structure, or (2) the agency
imposes conditions beyond those which the statute explicitly
authorizes. Under both circumstances, the agency would have replaced
the substantive provisions of a statutory program with a new program
of its own making, which the states would have had no way of
anticipating when they initially signed onto the program, much less
clear notice.
If the statute explicitly granted an agency broad power to
condition, the agency would argue that the state was on notice of the
possibility of open-ended conditions. But Sebelius contemplates precise,
not generalized, notice. When states signed up for Medicaid decades
ago, they knew it was subject to revision.1 24 They could not have
expected the program to remain static. Congress could and would
always tinker with it.125 But Sebelius indicates that knowledge of
possible change is insufficient to nullify coercion when the underlying
change is a matter of kind rather than degree.' 26
121. See generally Patricia E. Dilley, The Evolution of Entitlement: Retirement Income and the
Problem of Integrating Private Pensions and Social Security, 30 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1063 (1997)
(discussing the evolution of entitlement programs across time).
122. Id.
123. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2605-06 (2012) (plurality opinion).
124. See id. at 2605.
125. See id. ("Congress has in fact [made adjustments to the Medicaid program], sometimes
conditioning only the new funding, other times both old and new.").
126. See id. at 2605-06.
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When an agency transforms an entrenched and financially
substantial program through conditioned waivers that the statute did
not previously announce, a state likely has no choice but to agree. 127
The choice is to suffer federal sanctions or accept the conditions of a new
waiver. The sanctions could be as simple as fund termination, which
could also include reimbursing the federal government for some prior
expenditures. 12 8 Where citizens depend on or benefit from those
services, there is harm to both the state and its citizens. When the funds
are high enough, Sebelius indicates that suffering these harms is not a
real option.1 29 The other potential sanction might be to keep the
money-or some of it-but suffer sanctions or consequences on the
program and those that receive its funds, which may again harm the
state's subdepartments and citizens. 130 These sanctions also entail the
state earning the label of failure or statutory violator, which carries less
tangible but potentially serious stigmatic and political harms.1 31 Thus,
freely saying no to the conditions and exercising its own policy judgment
may not be an option for the state.
In sum, in contexts where agencies use waiver power to impose
conditions that go outside the scope of the underlying statute, the
program is transformed in ways that states could not have anticipated.
If the program is entrenched and involves significant funds, states may
have no choice but to agree. If states lack a real choice, they have been
subject to unconstitutional coercion. The political uncertainty this
situation may create only further intensifies the underlying coercion.
This context, however, is more likely the exception than the rule. Most
waivers and conditions would likely be narrower and would not involve
impermissible coercion.
3. Agencies Using Conditional Waivers to Remake Law
Waiver powers that effectively permit agencies to remake the
law raise two delegation doctrine questions. First, can Congress grant
agencies such power? Second, are there any limits on the scope of the
power that Congress may grant? Barron and Rakoff definitively answer
the first question, which also happens to be the easier one. No direct or
roughly analogous Supreme Court precedent prohibits a waiver power,
127. See id. at 2605.
128. See, e.g., id. at 2607.
129. See id. at 2604 ("[T]he financial 'inducement' Congress has chosen is much more than
'relatively mild encouragement'-it is a gun to the head.").
130. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 6316(c)(10)(C) (2012).
131. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 8, at 973.
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or a conditional waiver power, on its face.132 Thus, Congress can extend
agencies the authority to waive statutory requirements and replace
them with new ones. Barron and Rakoff reach this conclusion by
distinguishing the presidential line-item veto-which the Court struck
down-from conditional waivers1 33 and by emphasizing that delegation
doctrine permits agencies wide discretion in filling in legislative blanks
through regulation, so long as the legislation contains an intelligible
principle.1 34 They reason the same principle would permit agencies to
fill in blanks through conditions on waivers.
At a functional level, waiver power is very close to a presidential
line-item veto power, the latter of which the Court struck down in
Clinton v. City of New York.135 Both nullify or cut off the
implementation of a duly enacted law.136 They are, however, entirely
distinct in form. A line-item veto changes the constitutionally dictated
process through which a congressional bill becomes law.' 3 7 Waiver does
nothing to formally change legislation or the way it is made. Rather,
waiver involves an agency exercising the discretion afforded to it by a
duly enacted law. In addition, a line-item veto would formally eviscerate
a portion of the law that has passed both Houses of Congress, whereas
waiver leaves the law in place and amounts to a deferral on enforcing
it.138 Thus, Barron and Rakoff reason that Clinton's holding is
inapplicable to big waivers. 139
132. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 7, at 317-18. But see Andrew Dudley, Comment,
Opening Borders: Congressional Delegation of Discretionary Authority to Suspend or Repeal the
Laws of the United States, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 273 (2009) (arguing that the implications of
"constitutional, practical, and judicial concerns" in the context of "excisionary delegations" to
agencies militate against waiver power).
133. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 7, at 313-14.
134. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474-75 (2001); A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 530 (1935); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 428-
30 (1935); Barron & Rakoff, supra note 7.
135. 524 U.S. 417, 447-49 (1998).
136. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 7, at 268-69, 313-14.
137. See id. at 313 (explaining that the Line Item Veto Act was found to violate the
presentment requirement of the Constitution).
138. See id. at 313-14.
139. Barron and Rakoff's conclusion is likely correct, but they do not fully account for the
possibility that the Court in Clinton had functional concerns beyond the formalistic presentment
clause problems. Presentment formalities aside, a line-item veto affords the executive more
practical power in the lawmaking process than Congress, which is contrary to our constitutional
structure, even if Congress could find some way to achieve it without violating the presentment
clause. Big waiver involves the same functional shift of power to the executive. If this functional
shift is important, one should be careful in dismissing Clinton. Barron and Rakoff do indirectly
respond to this problem by emphasizing a timing difference between veto and waiver. Id. at 316-
17. A line-item veto invalidates congressional judgment within days of Congress reaching a
conclusion. In other words, the executive second guesses and overrides Congress. Because waiver
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The functional balance of power between Congress and the
executive is limited only by the nondelegation doctrine, which is
extremely permissive, making successful constitutional challenges to
big waiver on this ground generally unlikely. Baron and Rakoff reason
that if the nondelegation doctrine allows Congress to grant agencies the
power to initially make law through regulation, Congress may also
grant them the power to unmake and remake law through conditional
waivers. 140 So again, on the question of whether Congress can extend
waiver power to an agency, including the power to condition waivers,
the answer is yes. This, however, is a justification for small waiver, not
necessarily big waiver with broad or relatively limitless power to
condition the waiver.
Big waiver, unlike standard delegations of regulatory authority,
may involve a greater delegation than previously seen, and one not
easily susceptible to congressional constraint. In theory, conditional
waivers, big or small, pose no more problems than any other regulatory
authority, so long as Congress has articulated an intelligible principle
by which the agency is to exercise its power. But, in practice, conditional
waiver power raises questions and concerns that traditional delegations
do not.
First, as a functional matter, conditional waivers are three steps
removed from Congress, whereas traditional rulemaking is only one
step removed. The typical delegation of rulemaking authority involves
a broadly worded congressional standard and a directive to agencies to
pass regulations (step one). 14 1 A conditional waiver can involve a
specifically worded statute, no initial delegation to the agency (step
one), intervening facts that give rise to the waiver (step two), and the
would occur later in time, Congress's factual predicate may have proven false. Rather than second-
guessing Congress, an agency waiver may be necessary to carry out Congress's judgment and
desire that the law adapt to and fit varied circumstances. Thus far, however, waiver power is not
subject to time limitations or factual predicates, meaning waiver power could operate nearly
identically to a line-item veto. A court concerned with the functionally similar transfer of power to
the executive would unlikely have its concerns alleviated by the mere fact that Congress has
evaded the presentment clause problem by delaying the point at which the executive might act
until right after the bill becomes law. Nonetheless, those concerns are more easily addressed
through delegation doctrine and administrative law, which the following paragraphs address.
Thus, Baron and Rakoff's conclusion regarding Clinton stands.
140. See id. at 325-26.
141. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012) ("National primary ambient air quality standards,
prescribed under subsection (a) of this section shall be ambient air quality standards the
attainment and maintenance of which in the judgment of the Administrator, based on such criteria
and allowing an adequate margin of safety, are requisite to protect the public health."); see also
Bressman, supra note 79 (discussing how the Court addressed Congress's broad delegation of
authority in AT & T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366 (1999)).
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imposition of conditions on those waivers (step three).1 42 This further
removal from Congress is a legitimate reason why a court may be more
restrictive on delegations. If the functional and temporal removal from
Congress does not factor into the analysis, a permissive nondelegation
doctrine could theoretically permit Congress to pass a statutory
framework that never requires revisiting or revision-regardless of
changes in the predicate upon which Congress initially acted-as the
agency would always have the authority to take "the next step." In other
words, Congress would no longer need to legislate.
Second, articulating workable intelligible principles for
conditional waivers may be more challenging than with a traditional
delegation. With big waiver, Congress is necessarily trying to legislate
for unforeseeable future circumstances, 1 4 3 which makes articulating
substantive criteria for conditions difficult. If Congress articulates
precise intelligible principles for the waiver and conditions, the
legislation would easily comply with the nondelegation doctrine, but the
principle likely hamstrings agencies in confronting changed
circumstances for which the provisions were written.144 Vaguer
principles free the agency to address changed circumstances, but they
tend to become less intelligible and create more constitutional concerns.
To be fully effective in meeting a distant and unknown future, the
intelligible principle would need to be as broad as possible. This alone
does not render the delegation unconstitutional but suggests that
effective big waivers may inherently tend toward the outer reaches of
delegation doctrine and risk breaches of it, while traditional delegations
do not.
Third, the power to undo law and remake it is potentially larger
than the power to make it. In so far as the power to remake is exercised
formally and temporally further from Congress and under more vague
language, an agency has the propensity to act more on its judgment
than Congress's. If Congress's initial statute explicitly constrains the
conditional waiver power or the Court reasons that the overall statute
operates as a limitation on the scope of conditions, the conditional
waiver power remains in check. This, however, is not equivalent to the
big waiver power to remake the law that Barron and Rakoff propound.
If an agency has true power to remake the law, Congress would have
retained no power for itself other than to write a "first draft" of a law
142. See, e.g., No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002)
(codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.); U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 18 (describing the
conditions for the granting of NCLB waivers).
143. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 7, at 270-71.
144. See id. at 322-23.
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that has no binding effect on the agency. And, if an agency can unmake
the law for any reason and then condition that unmaking on any basis
it wishes, almost nothing would be off limits to the agency. In other
words, a veto power followed by an unconstrained legislative power is
broader than a power to regulate within an existing and continued
legislative framework. So long as the legislation exists, it necessarily
limits. Once it is waived, it does not limit. It is this small but meaningful
distinction of substantive power that also distinguished the President's
normal constitutional legislative veto from the statutorily enacted-
and unconstitutional-presidential power to exercise a line-item
veto. 145 The latter is a greater power than the former.
These distinctions and concerns, however, do not point to a
simple doctrinal solution. One solution is to ignore the problems and
summarily reason that conditional waivers are constitutional because
remaking the law is no different than making it pursuant to an
intelligible principle. To the extent big waiver would be the largest
delegation to date, this solution would be yet another concession to the
notion that there are no meaningful limits to delegation. The other
option is for the Court to limit waivers through constitutional doctrine.
The Court could hold that (1) big waivers are per se unconstitutional
delegations because they veto law, (2) conditional waivers are per se
unconstitutional because they rewrite the law, (3) waivers and the
conditions to be imposed on them must be constrained by an intelligible
limiting principle in the statute, or (4) waivers and the conditions to be
imposed on them must be constrained by a definite-more than
intelligible-limiting principle in the statute.
The first two holdings are undesirable. As Baron and Rakoff
point out, big waiver is a positive policy development in many
respects-the exact thing the Court has shied from impeding in the
past. 14 6 The likelihood of the Court categorically limiting waiver power
is next to zero.1 47 The third holding would provide greater flexibility,
but possibly too much if the Court wanted to provide a meaningful
hedge against the dangers of big waiver. If big waiver is a bigger power
than traditional delegation, applying the intelligible principle doctrine
to waivers would theoretically permit larger delegations than the
already enormous ones previously sanctioned. On the other hand, a
factually intense analysis of conditional waivers and the context in
145. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 442-44 (1998).
146. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 7, at 270-71.
147. See generally Bressman, supra note 79 (arguing that rather than reining in Congress's
delegation authority, courts will require agencies to limit their own authority under those
delegations).
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which they operate, on a case by case basis, could expose the breadth of
the delegation in some circumstances and demonstrate that a statute
lacked a sufficiently intelligible principle. Part IV.B's application of
delegation doctrine to NCLB waivers provides but one example.
The fourth holding would avoid the problems of the first three.
It would permit conditional or big waiver, but could circumscribe waiver
power in a way that makes the size of the power granted through big
waiver roughly proportional to traditional delegations under the
intelligible principle doctrine. Thus, it would retain the current balance
of power between Congress and the executive branch struck by the
Court in Whitman v. American Trucking and its progreny. Weighing
against this approach, however, is that a "definite principle" approach
would increase the legislative burden on Congress and require
statutory precision that could indirectly limit Congress's ability to
prospectively deal with complex and evolving contexts through agency
waiver power. 148
In sum, the Court has two viable constitutional approaches to
dealing with the problem of big waiver, but each has a potential
downside, which explains why the Court has avoided adopting
restrictive constitutional delegation doctrine for so long. Faced with the
issue of big waivers, the Court could easily stay its current doctrinal
course, adopting the approach of third holding but would have good
reason to consider the fourth. This Article's analysis considers both in
its later application of delegation doctrine to NCLB waivers.
4. Statutory Construction to Avoid Constitutional Issues
a. Requiring Explicit Condition Power and Scope
To avoid the dangers of policing delegations through
constitutional doctrine, the Court has increasingly turned to statutory
and administrative law analysis, with a particular focus on scope of
authority. 14 9 Rather than finding the delegations themselves
unconstitutional-even when they normatively might be-the Court
has found that agencies exercised powers beyond the scope of those
148. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 321 (2000)
(arguing that revival of nondelegation doctrine poses two serious problems: "judicial enforcement
of the nondelegation doctrine would raise serious problems of judicial competence and would
greatly magnify the role of the judiciary in overseeing the operation of modern government" and
this oversight would do little "to improve the operation of the regulatory state. It may well make
things worse, possibly much worse.").
149. See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 220 (1994); see also Sunstein,
supra note 148, at 329-36 (discussing the Court's cannons for policing delegation without resorting
to constitutional doctrine).
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delegated by statute.150 In the era of big delegations, this entails the
Court narrowly construing the scope of Congress's delegation. Whether
the problem originates from an otherwise unconstitutional delegation
or an overreach by the agency, the Court, through scope analysis, can
place checks on Congressional delegations.
A scope of authority approach to conditional waiver power could,
likewise, enforce meaningful limits without impeding Congress's ability
to extend power to agencies when needed. A scope analysis could guard
against delegation problems in one of two ways. The first would be to
reason that the power to condition does not fall within the scope of the
power to waive. Thus, in the absence of explicitly statutory language,
an agency lacks the authority to condition waivers. One step further
would be to reason, even when condition power is explicitly granted,
agencies can only impose those categories or types of conditions
provided for in the statute. This second approach would put the onus on
Congress to articulate how and when conditions can be imposed but
allow Congress substantial latitude when it articulates terms.
The second approach, however, might overlook nuance in how
waivers operate in practice. Absent an emergency necessitating a
waiver, 15 1 the decision to waive is rarely clear cut. In a typical case, the
decision of whether to waive would involve an agency's assessment of
state's past compliance with the statute, the extent of the current
noncompliance, and the likelihood of the state achieving further
compliance in the future.1 52 In this context, an agency would not want
to unconditionally waive compliance, nor would it want to flatly deny
waiver. 153 But limiting the agency to these two options increases the
risk of the agency adopting an intractable position rather than engaging
in back and forth negotiations aimed at both the agency and the state
getting something out of the deal. 1 5 4 If forced to choose between
unconditioned waiver and no waiver, an agency might often grudgingly
choose no waiver and impose sanctions-the "agency nuke"-in the
attempt to scare other states straight.15 5 This option amounts to the
150. See MCI Telecomms., 512 U.S. at 234.
151. See Kate R. Bowers, Saying What the Law Isn't: Legislative Delegations of Waiver
Authority in Environmental Laws, 34 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 257, 267-70 (2010) (discussing
environmental emergency waivers and noting that "[w]aiver provisions are frequently triggered
by emergencies").
152. See Jim Rossi, Waivers, Flexibility, and Reviewability, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1359, 1365-
66 (1997) (discussing circumstances under which an agency would waive its own regulations).
153. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 7, at 326; Daniels, supra note 119, at 471-73.
154. See Daniels, supra note 119, at 485-86, 493-94.
155. See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 97, at ¶¶ 104-06, 114, 117-26, 133-36, 143-
59 (demonstrating the Bush administration's early refusal to grant waivers of provisions of the No
Child Left Behind Act); see also CAL. EDUc. CODE §§ 10601, 10601.5, 10802, 10804 (West 2014). It
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lesser of two evils that thwarts both congressional and agency objectives
in the short term.156
b. Inferring Condition Power and Scope
Rather than cutting off the ability to impose any waiver
conditions not specifically articulated by a statute, a scope of authority
analysis could infer a conditional waiver authority but limit the
conditions to those falling within the overall scope of the controlling
statute. Thus, if a statute was designed to achieve objectives A and B,
an agency could not condition a waiver on a state achieving objective C
instead. A scope of analysis might, likewise, impose scope limitations
not just on objectives-as objectives may be broad and manipulable-
but on the methods of achieving the objectives if Congress has
delineated a type of method or placed certain methods off-limits. 157 This
approach would offer agencies the ability to negotiate further statutory
compliance without the problem of open-ended authority.
This approach can also be harmonized with the Court's
"intelligible principle" nondelegation doctrine. If an intelligible
principle is the hallmark of constitutional delegations, the statutory
text and framework as a whole operates as the intelligible principle by
which an agency can condition a waiver. Inferring an intelligible
principle for waiver conditions from the statute also reserves the law-
making function and substantive judgments for Congress, while
affording practical flexibility to Congress and agencies. In this respect,
implying waiver condition authority that is limited to the scope of the
statute maintains the precedential status quo, allowing agencies no
more or less delegation authority in regard to waivers than elsewhere.
took a statutory amendment by Congress, eliminating California's statutory prohibition against
linking student and teacher data, to deal with California's noncompliance on the high quality
teacher requirement.
156. After all, Congress includes waivers as an escape clause from statutes and, thus, one that
can be reasonably exercised.
157. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 7, at 325-26. Using scope to limit methods becomes
more complicated because waiver conditions that did anything other than condition the waiver on
future substantial compliance would necessarily entail the state taking a different approach to
compliance. A scope analysis that tightly limited methods would effectively eliminate the ability
to condition waivers. Thus, by method scope, I mean to suggest that if Congress had said that the
way to improve educational achievement is to increase teacher certification requirements, a scope
analysis might prohibit waiver conditions mandating funding equity. While that condition might
also improve achievement, it does so through a method far removed from increasing teacher
certification requirements.
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c. Identifying the Scope of Permissible Conditions
An implied scope approach, however, does not come without
costs. It demands difficult analysis to determine the scope of a statute
and raises the question of whose judgment of scope takes primacy: the
courts' or the agencies'. The broader the statute in coverage or more
complex in its statutory framework the more difficult it would be to
characterize the scope of permissible conditions an agency can impose
through waiver.
Consider environmental regulation. Current environmental
laws focus not on the environment in general but on specific aspects.
Individual statutes cover distinct aspects or categories of the
environment (air, water, waste, etc.) and limit regulation in those
categories to "activities" producing "pollutants."1 5 8 But imagine a
statute that included four different mechanisms through which to
achieve its stated purpose of promoting a healthy environment. Would
the promotion of a healthy environment define the scope or the four
mechanisms that Congress adopted to achieve that purpose? If the
former, an agency could broadly define healthy environment and
arguably adopt any rational means under the sun to promote it. 159 For
instance, one might argue that light and noise pollution degrade our
environment and, thus, could be regulated. 160
If the statute's chosen mechanisms for achieving a healthy
environment defined the scope, the statute would have an articulable
limiting scope that would likely exclude light and noise pollution
regulation. Yet, the statute would still be subject to expansive
interpretation of what things fall within the statute's current
mechanisms. Assume, for instance, Congress had mandated an
improvement in pollutants filtration in smoke stacks. A cap-and-trade
system, although not mentioned or conceived of in the statute, arguably
falls within the increase on filtration method because the agency
reasons that a cap-and-trade system will incentivize substantial
numbers of companies to increase filtration.
The point here is how quickly and how far the chain of proximate
cause or asserted proximate cause could be stretched to make a desired
policy position fit within an existing statutory scheme. This difficulty,
158. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 13 6 -13 6 y
(2012); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671; Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1388; Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q.
159. See John Copeland Nagle, The Idea of Pollution, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 55-60 (2009)
("[E]nvironments affected by pollution are simply areas defined by boundaries of our own
making.").
160. See id. at 29, 56, 67.
644 [Vol. 68:3:607
FEDERALIZING EDUCATION BY WAIVER?
of course, is not new. It is the standard battle that routinely occurs
between agencies and regulated entities in regard to administrative
rulemaking. With rulemaking, however, Congress has made it clear
that agencies should fill statutory gaps. Thus, Congress contemplates
and allows agency rationalizations. But when both the power to
condition waivers and their scope are implied, an agency can both assert
and define its own power.
To place any practical limit on agencies' conditioning of waivers,
courts (not agencies) must be the arbiters of scope. Even Barron and
Rakoff concur on this point.161 An agency could make a strong argument
that the Chevron deference standard should apply to its reasonable
interpretation of a statute's scope,1 6 2 but scope inquiries are distinct
from interpretations of ambiguous statutory language. Scope raises a
question of legal authority, which is the domain of courts, as opposed to
substantive and context-specific concepts in which agencies may have
unique expertise. The Court, on more than one occasion, has
emphasized this type of distinction between legal authority and
substantive interpretation, rejecting agencies' attempt to use their
interpretative discretion as a guise to expand their legal authority.
In MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T,163 Congress had
granted the Federal. Communications Commission the power to
"modify" statutory requirements.1 64 The FCC reasoned that the power
to "modify" justified the agency's elimination of tariffs-tariffs that
Congress had initially provided for by statute.1 65 The Court did not
defer to the FCC's interpretation of "modify" but defined the term itself
as meaning "to change moderately or in minor fashion."1 66 The Court
then assessed the scope of the statute and how tariffs fit within it,
concluding that the tariff provisions were at "the heart" of the
statute. 6 7 Thus, the "elimination of the crucial provision of the statute
for forty percent of a major sector of the industry is much too extensive
161. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 7, at 323-24 (reasoning if the determination of big
waiver power is under review, courts should make the decision independently because big waivers
enlarge agency power).
162. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. at 837, 842-44 (1984)
(creating the presumption that a reviewing court should assume that Congress has delegated the
gap-filling task to the agency where Congress has left the statute ambiguous),
163. 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
164. Id. at 220; see also 47 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2) (2012).
165. MCI Telecomms., 512 U.S at 220.
166. See id. at 225-28.
167. Id. at 229.
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to be considered a 'modification' " and "goes beyond the meaning that
the statute can bear." 168
In FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, the Court applied
the same reasoning, this time focusing on the importance of the
interpretation and authority asserted by the agency. 169 There the Court
reasoned that the larger the authority asserted by the agency, the more
clear it must be that Congress had intended that authority. 170 "[W]e are
confident that Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision
of such economic and political significance to an agency in so cryptic a
fashion." 171 The Court reiterated this same point in Whitman v.
American Trucking Associations: "Congress, we have held, does not
alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or
ancillary provisions-it does not, one might say, hide elephants in
mouseholes." 172
This line of cases offers strong support for the notion that when
Congress reaches a conclusion as to how best to achieve its ends and
creates a particular regulatory scheme-as opposed to leaving it to an
agency in the first instance-it is antithetical to infer that Congress
intended to permit an agency to replace that scheme with any one for
which the agency can make a reasonable argument. In short, implied
waivers and conditions cannot give rise to big waiver power-that is,
the power to remake a statute. Thus, Barron and Rakoff concede that
"[i]f we accept that the statute in MCI was linguistically ambiguous
about granting the agency the authority of little waiver or big waiver,
Justice Scalia's opinion can be read as establishing a clear statement
rule for recognizing the existence of a big waiver authority." 173
Barron and Rakoff discount this logic, however, for two reasons.
First, Congress rarely hammers out the fundamental details of
regulation, and, as a result, inferring waiver power does not portend
numerous reversals of Congressional will. 17 Second, when Congress
grants the power to waive, it is granting a reversal power.17 5 As to the
first point, the number of congressional reversals is irrelevant as to
168. Id. at 229, 231.
169. See 529 U.S. 120, 159-60 (2000).
170. See id. In Brown, the Food and Drug Administration argued that its explicit statutory
authority to regulate drugs included the authority to regulate tobacco, notwithstanding the fact
that Congress had passed various other tobacco regulation statutes in which the FDA played no
role. Id. at 125, 143-57.
171. Id. at 160.
172. 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
173. Barron & Rakoff, supra note 7, at 322.
174. See id. at 323-234.
175. Id.
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whether those reversals are authorized. Thus, Barron and Rakoff's
rejoinder rests on the single premise that reversal power is incidental
to waiver power. But the term "waive" will not bear the weight of their
interpretation. Waive is only the equivalent of reverse if, by reverse,
one only means "to terminate the current course of action." When they
speak of waive, they mean something more than terminate the current
course of action. They mean big waiver, which includes termination and
replacement.
In addition, when Congress intends waiver power as an escape
clause from harming states that have acted in good faith, Congress is
not extending to agencies a power to reverse Congress but to effectuate
its will to do no undesirable harm. A reversal power can do the opposite.
It can give agencies the power to determine that Congress's regulatory
plan is insufficiently effective and needs change as the agency moves
forward, or even more aggressively, that the agency has a better idea
even if Congress's was not flawed. Congress can surely grant an agency
reversal power without violating nondelegation and scope doctrine, but
the lesson of the foregoing line of cases is that this power is so
significant that Congress must explicitly grant it. Agencies cannot
simply infer it. And courts, not agencies, are the appropriate arbiters of
scope.
III. IMPOSING NEW POLICY BY WAIVING No CHILD LEFT BEHIND
Evaluating the constitutionality of the conditions imposed on
NCLB waivers requires an understanding of the circumstances and
events through which they developed. As funding legislation, NCLB
was set to automatically expire after a period of years and required
reauthorization in 2007.176 States' progress, or lack thereof, toward full
proficiency on standardized tests during the intervening years made it
clear that the Act needed more than a basic reauthorization. To avoid
labeling an overwhelming majority of the nation's schools as failures
that were subject to mandatory sanctions, NCLB needed a substantial
rewrite. 177 The demands of the Great Recession and the debate over the
Affordable Care Act reduced an otherwise crucial reauthorization to an
afterthought. Two years into his term, President Obama finally issued
a detailed blueprint for reauthorization of the Elementary and
176. MARIS A. VINOVSKIS, FROM A NATION AT RISK TO NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND: NATIONAL
EDUCATION GOALS AND THE CREATION OF FEDERAL EDUCATION POLICY 200 (2009).
177. See Derek W. Black, Civil Rights, Charter Schools, and Lessons to Be Learned, 64 FLA.
L. REV. 1723, 1753, 1756 (2012) (explaining the Act set unrealistically high expectations that could
only be met by blatant test manipulation).
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Secondary Education Act ("ESEA").178 The terms of the blueprint
mirrored the policies that the Administration had already been
pursuing through a competitive grant process funded through economic
stimulus funds.
Continued fights over health care and the economy and a shift
of power in Congress prevented reauthorization from moving
forward.179 Relations between the Administration and Congress grew
so acrimonious that the Administration effectively gave up on any
major legislative effort in any area, indicating it would take
administrative action to achieve its policy ends. 180 In education, this
meant using the widespread occurrence of NCLB noncompliance and
the Secretary of Education's waiver authority to promote policies
consistent with the Administration's previously announced
reauthorization policies. Thus, rather than an escape clause for states,
waivers became a mechanism for achieving the Administration's
affirmative policy objectives that could not be achieved elsewhere. In
short, the waiver process became a substitute for the legislative process.
The Administration's objectives cannot resolve questions of
constitutional authority and statutory scope, but the lead-up to the
waivers provides an important frame of reference for identifying the
scope of NCLB, proposed changes to it, and the conditional waivers that
substituted for both. Because the waiver conditions mirrored the
legislative rewrite of NCLB, which the Administration insisted was
necessary in light of the Act's past failures, they beg the question of how
that new legislative agenda could fall within the scope of the statute it
was intended to replace. The following subsections identify the policy
high points of the competitive grant process, the reauthorization
blueprint, and the waiver conditions, drawing connections between
them and providing a basis by which to assess whether the final waivers
fall within the scope of NCLB.
178. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 16. The ESEA was originally passed in 1965, and
has been reauthorized seven times since. NCLB, enacted in January 2002, was the most recent
authorization of the Act.
179. See e.g., Sam Dillon, New Challenges for Obama's Education Agenda in the Face of a
G.O.P.-Led House, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2010, at A36, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/12/12/us/politics/12education.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.ccl8Y9W-KYD7 (noting
that the new House committee chairman with jurisdiction over education had expressed interest
in reducing the federal role in education); US States, Local Governments Plead for New 'No Child
Left Behind,' REUTERS (Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/05/usa-education-
legislation-idUSL1NOB5AJU20130205, archived at http://perma.cc/KPT8-BDEX (discussing letter
from National Governors' Association reiterating continued requests for NCLB reauthorization).
180. See Peter Nicholas & Don Lee, Obama Uses Executive Power--and the Bully Pulpit, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 24, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/201 1/oct/24/news/la-pn-obama-housing-
20111024, archived at http://perma.cc/LML6-F9FS.
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A. Setting the Stage: Race to the Top Grants
In February 2009, Congress authorized $787.2 billion to
stimulate and stabilize the failing economy. 181 Ninety-seven billion
dollars was allocated to cover states' and local districts' education
budget shortfalls and to prevent the massive layoff of teachers.1 8 2 A
small but significant slice of those education funds were reserved for
competitive grants.'83 The Secretary of Education was authorized to use
the funds to foster educational innovation and improvement.184 The
authorizing legislation deferred to the Secretary regarding the criteria
by which state applications would be evaluated.185
The first of these competitive grant programs was the $4.35
billion Race to the Top Fund ("RTT"). 8 6 The Department indicated that
it would use RTT to spur four innovations and reforms:
Adopting standards and assessments that prepare students to succeed in college and the
workplace and to compete in the global economy;
Building data systems that measure student growth and success, and inform teachers and
principals about how they can improve instruction;
Recruiting, developing, rewarding, and retaining effective teachers and principals,
especially where they are needed most; and
Turning around our lowest-achieving schools. 187
States that did not commit to these strategies would be ineligible for
grants. 188
181. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 3, 123 Stat.
115, 115-16 (codified at I.R.C. § 1 note (2012)).
182. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT: SPENDING
REPORT BY PROGRAM 1 (2011), available at http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/leg/recovery/
reports.html (detailing the funding allocated under the ARRA to educational programs); U.S.
DEP'T OF EDUC., AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT REPORT: SUMMARY OF PROGRAMS
AND STATE-BY-STATE DATA 3-4 (2009), http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/leg/recovery/spending/arra-
program-summary.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/G2JA-C4ZS [hereinafter, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
SUMMARY OF PROGRAMS] ("As the economy slowed in 2008, State revenues declined dramatically
and many were unable to fully fund their ... education budgets.").
183. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 § 14006; U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
EDUC., SUMMARY OF PROGRAMS, supra note 182, at 3.
184. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 § 14006; U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
EDUC., SUMMARY OF PROGRAMS, supra note 182, at 241.
185. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, §§ 14006(c), 14007.
186. See id.
187. 74 Fed. Reg. 59,836 (Nov. 18, 2009); U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC, RACE TO THE ToP PROGRAM:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (2009), available at http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-
summary.pdf.
188. See 74 Fed. Reg. 59,843-45 (Nov. 18, 2009); Race to the Top Fund, 74 Fed. Reg. 59,688,
59,696-97 (Nov. 18, 2009) (codified in scattered sections of 34 C.F.R. subtit.B ch.II)
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The workplace and college standards requirement had a specific
intent behind it: incentivizing states to adopt the Common Core
standards or curriculum. 89 In fact, all twelve states that received a
RTT grant adopted or promised to adopt the Common Core.o90 To be
fair, several states had already begun the process of adopting the
Common Core, but the Department clearly took a side in the debate. 191
The data and teacher effectiveness requirements were, likewise,
designed to foster another specific agenda: basing teacher hiring,
promotion, retention, and compensation on value-added assessments of
teaching.1 92 The fourth requirement was part escape clause, part new
agenda. The school turnaround requirement diverged from the NCLB
approach of sanctioning all schools that fail to meet full proficiency,
instead only requiring states to focus their turnaround strategies on the
very lowest performing schools.1 93
While small in size, RTT proved effective in spurring significant
change. Why is slightly less clear. Either states were willing to do
almost anything to offset their dramatically falling revenues during the
recession, or they substantively agreed with the Department's policies.
Heated battles over teacher accountability and charter school laws at
the local level suggest the former,1 94 particularly given how quickly
189. See Robert S. Eitel & Kent D. Talbert, The Road to a National Curriculum: The Legal
Aspects of the Common Core Standards, Race to the Top, and Conditional Waivers, 13 ENGAGE: J.
FEDERALIST Soc'Y PRAc. GROUPS 17, 21 (2012); 74 Fed. Reg. at 59,733 ("In [the Race to the Top
Fund], the phrase 'common standards' does not refer to any specific set of common standards, such
as the Common Core Standards.").
190. See Eitel & Talbert, supra note 189, at 21. As discussed supra note 1, the definition of
curriculum and whether the Common Core is curriculum became a heated battled, albeit well after
it had already been adopted. Telling is the fact that the state agencies appeared to give little
thought to calling it curriculum. See, e.g., Common Core, ENGAGE NY, https://
www.engageny.org/common-core-curriculum, archived at https://perma.cclH9KF-6ZNX (last
visited Feb. 9, 2015). What is very clear is that the Common Core standards require that they
adopt a Common Core Curriculum. See generally id.
191. See Eitel & Talbert, supra note 189, at 21.
192. See Benjamin Michael Superfine, Stimulating School Reform: The American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act and the Shifting Federal Role in Education, 76 Mo. L. REV. 81, 98-99 (2011).
193. In later guidance, the Department demanded one particular type of turnaround strategy
and innovation: charter schools. Secretary Duncan cautioned that states that "put artificial caps
on the growth of charter schools will jeopardize their applications under the Race to the Top Fund."
David Nagel, Charter School Support Is a Prerequisite for Race to the Top Funds, JOURNAL (June
09, 2009), http://thejournal.com/articles/2009/06/09/charter-school-support-is-a-prerequisite-for-
race-to-the-top-funds.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/TSA5-YR2K.
194. See e.g., Lesli A. Maxwell, California 'Tire Wall" Becomes Hot Issue, EDUC. WEEK, Aug.
12, 2009, at 19; Erik W. Robelen, State Picture on Charter Caps Still Mixed: Some Easing
Restrictions as Federal Officials Urge, Though Others Reluctant, EDUC. WEEK, Aug. 12, 2009, at
19.
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states adopted the new policies notwithstanding controversy.1 9 5
Motivations aside, the important point is that RTT was the first sign of
a major shift in federal education policy, both in substance and form.
"While NCLB largely focuses on the implementation of accountability
mechanisms to leverage educational improvement, [RTTI at least
appears to involve some sort of overarching strategy focused on building
the capacities of states, districts, and schools to meet performance
goals." 196 Moreover, unlike NCLB, RTT focuses on "the quality and
consistency of state standards themselves" and "emphasizes the broad
improvement of the educator workforce and the development of data
systems, linked to state standards, that can facilitate this improvement
effort."197
B. The Administration's Blueprint for Reauthorizing the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act
A year later, the Administration released A Blueprint for
Reform: The Reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act. 198 It summarized its four goals as "(1) Improving teacher
and principal effectiveness; (2) Providing information to families to help
them evaluate and improve their children's schools; (3) Implementing
college- and career-ready standards; and (4) Improving student
learning and achievement in America's lowest-performing schools by
providing intensive support and effective interventions."1 99 For the
purposes of this Article, two points are crucial. First, the
Administration itself directly tied the blueprint to its prior RTT policy
goals, stating that the blueprint was "[miodeled after the Race to the
Top." 20 0 In fact, the four goals of reauthorization are almost identical to
the conditions placed on RTT applications. The only distinctions
between the two are semantic phrasing and the blueprint's inclusion of
the generic goal of better informing parents. Second, the
Administration indicated that the blueprint goals were a hard break
195. See CTR. ON EDUC. POL'Y, AN EARLY LOOK AT THE ECONOMIC STIMULUS PACKAGE AND
THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 2 (2009) (reporting that forty-one states planned to apply for RTT grants
even though the requirements governing the program are stricter than the requirements for other
ARRA programs); Superfine, supra note 192, at 107-08.
196. Superfine, supra note 192, at 105.
197. Id.
198. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 16 (describing the educational reform vision of the
Obama Administration).
199. Id. at 3.
200. Id. at 36.
2015] 651
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
from the substance and structure of NCLB. 201 President Obama stated:
"My Administration's blueprint for reauthorization of the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act is not only a plan to renovate a flawed
law, but also an outline for a re-envisioned federal role in education." 202
Had NCLB been reauthorized, the subject of this Article would
have been mooted, but reauthorization was initially stalled by the
demands of the failing economy and the Administration's focus on
health care reform. 203 Reauthorization was later made all but
impossible by intractable political fights over passing the budget,
raising the debt ceiling, and repealing the Affordable Care Act. 20 4 At
that point, the Administration gave up on legislation, indicating it
would not wait on Congress. 205 Instead, the Administration would
pursue policy changes through executive action. 206 In most areas, the
administrative action was but a half-measure to forestall immediate
problems, but education provided the context to exercise a more
expansive power.
C. The Conditions of Waiver
By the fall of 2011, more than eighty percent of the nation's
schools were set to be labeled as failing. 207 Under NCLB, those
education systems would be subject to a series of escalating and harsh
consequences, including school closings, district restructuring, and fund
termination. 208 Those sanctions would have been a practical and
political disaster for both the schools and the U.S. Department of
Education. The best solution-altering the legislation through
reauthorization-was off the table at that point. The only viable option
was for the Department to use its waiver power.
NCLB provides that "the Secretary may waive any statutory or
regulatory requirement of this chapter for a State educational agency,
201. See id. at 2.
202. Id.
203. Perry Bacon Jr., Health-care Debate Delayed Action on Other Big Issues, WASH. POST,
Jan. 19, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/18/
AR2010011803519.html, archived at http://perma.ce/7LC8-JCVM.
204. Id.; Michele McNeil, Committee Sets Sights on ESEA: House Hearings Mark Start of
Reauthorization Process, EDUC. WEEK, Feb. 24, 2010, at 20-21.
205. See, e.g., Jobs & The Economy: Putting America Back to Work, WHITEHOUSE.GOV,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/economy/jobs/we-cant-wait, archived at http://perma.cclV9BU-M7CT
(last visited Mar. 10, 2015) (President Obama stating, "Where [Congress] won't act, I will.").
206. Bacon, supra note 203; Richard Wolf, Obama Seeks an End Run Past Congress, USA
TODAY, Oct. 27, 2011, at 5A.
207. Dillon, supra note 3.
208. 20 U.S.C § 6316(b)(7) (2012) (describing sanctions).
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local educational agency, Indian tribe, or school through a local
educational agency, that . . . requests a waiver." 209 In other words, the
Secretary is free to waive all of the accountability, teacher and testing
requirement provisions that were the hallmark of NCLB. 210 A state that
desires a waiver must "submit a waiver request" that specifically
identifies those statutory or regulatory provisions of NCLB for which it
is requesting a waiver and explain how a waiver will "(i) increase the
quality of instruction for students; and (ii) improve the academic
achievement of students."211 It must also set "measurable educational
goals" and the methods for measuring and meeting those goals.212
In September 2011, Secretary Arne Duncan invited states to
apply for waivers or request flexibility. 213 He also announced the
Administration's intent to break course from NCLB because too many
circumstances had changed since its passage. First, state-level
responses to RTT and movement toward the Common Core had
demonstrated that better reforms were possible. He remarked that
these reforms "were not anticipated when the No Child Left Behind Act
of 2001 (NCLB) was enacted nearly a decade ago." 2 14 Second, NCLB's
approach simply does not work. He explained: "[I]t inadvertently
encouraged some States to set low academic standards, failed to
recognize or reward growth in student learning, and did little to elevate
the teaching profession or recognize the most effective teachers." 215 He
would use the waiver process to "help ensure that Federal laws and
policies can support these [new] reforms and not hinder State and local
innovation aimed at increasing the quality of instruction and improving
student academic achievement." 216
The Secretary was crystal clear regarding what a state must do
to receive a waiver: comply with his conditions. First, states must adopt
"college- and career-ready expectations for all students in . . . at least
209. Id. § 7861(a).
210. Id. § 7861(c).
211. Id. § 7861(b)(1)(B)(i)-(ii).
212. Id. § 7861(b)(1)(C).
213. Letter from Arne Duncan, U.S. Sec'y of Educ., to Chief State School Officers (Sept. 23,
2011), available at http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/secletter/110923.html, archived at http://
perma.cclY5NL-ZL5H. After some states chose not to seek or were denied waivers, the Department
began allowing individual school districts to apply for waivers. See, e.g., Lyndsey Layton, Arne
Duncan Gives No Child Left Behind Waivers to California Districts, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2013.
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/localleducation/arne-duncan-gives-no-child-left-
behind-waiver-to-calif-districts/2013/08/06/7de21f48-fed2-11e2-96a8-d3b92lcG924a-story.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/JAD7-XA2C.
214. Letter from arne Duncan, supra note 213.
215. Id.
216. Id.
2015]1 653
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
reading/language arts and mathematics" and develop assessments of
that curriculum that "measure student growth." 217 Second, states "must
develop and implement a system of differentiated recognition,
accountability, and support for all [schools]," which means setting
differentiated and achievable annual measurable goals and focusing
turnaround strategies on the lowest performing schools and those with
the highest achievement gaps.218 Third, states and local districts must
adopt "teacher and principal evaluation and support systems" that
"meaningfully differentiate [teacher] performance" into at least three
levels based on "student growth" data and other factors. 219 States and
districts must use that data to "evaluate teachers and principals on a
regular basis" and "inform personnel decisions." 220 Finally, states must
"remove duplicative and burdensome reporting requirements that have
little or no impact on student outcomes."2 21
These conditions mirrored the RTT conditions and the
reauthorization blueprint.222 A meaningful distinction cannot be found
between the three. The Department's waiver guidance documents are
simply a solidification of the broad concepts first articulated in RTT and
the blueprint, with the Administration offering nuance and detail
regarding how states should measure student growth, evaluate
teachers, and focus on failing schools. 223 And by this time, the external
work on developing the Common Core had significantly advanced,
making it the de facto means by which to comply with the waiver
requirement of college- and career-ready standards. 224
Two things, however, were very different. First, the conditions
were no longer part of a voluntary grant program or negotiated political
process; they were unilateral executive prerogative. Second, these
217. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 18, at 5.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 6.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Michele McNeil & Alyson Klein, Obama Outlines NCLB Flexibility: Plan Waives
Cornerstone Provisions of Law, EDUC. WEEK, Sept. 28, 2011, at 1. 20. 21 ("Many of the provisions
in the waiver package are embedded in the Obama administration's March 2010 blueprint for
revamping the ESEA, such as a shift toward college- and career-ready standards and a more
nuanced accountability system.").
223. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 18, at 4-6.
224. See Eitel & Talbert, supra note 189, at 12-13; see also Alyson Klein, Arne Duncan
Extends NCLB Waivers For Five States, Some with Caveats, EDUC. WEEK BLOG (Aug. 14, 2014,
3:41 PM), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/2014/08/arne-duncan-extends-nclb
waive_1.html?qs=Arne+Duncan+Extends+NCLB+Waivers+For+Five+States,+Some+With+Cave
ats, archived at http://perma.cclH345-LBKT (indicating North Carolina's renewal of its NCLB
waiver was held up in 2014 because the state was considering revising or reversing its adoption of
the Common Core).
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conditions supplanted existing law with a new approach. NCLB's
standardized testing goals, demographic group accountability, teacher
certification requirements, and punitive sanctions would all be gone. 2 25
Also gone would be states' wide discretion over selecting and measuring
academic standards.226
This consistent policy agenda may have seemed natural and
advantageous to the Administration. But from a legal and legislative
perspective, it raises serious questions of whether the Administration
had the authority to impose its agenda through NCLB waivers. The
legislation that provided RTT funding granted the Administration the
power to pursue educational improvement as it saw fit in the context of
competitive grants. 227 The reauthorization process afforded the
Administration the platform to promote and critique any agendas it saw
fit and use any successes from RTT to back up its position. The
Administration did both.
For two years, Secretary Duncan and President Obama asked
Congress to grant them the power through the ESEA to force states to
do two things in particular: (1) adopt college and career standards and
(2) measure student growth and teacher effectiveness. 2 2 8 In 2011, the
President's budget explicitly put this power request before Congress. In
his budget request, he boiled down the reauthorization of NCLB to the
following statement: "replace [NCLB's adequate yearly progress model]
with a broader picture of school performance that looks at student
growth and school progress." 2 2 9 Implicit in this request and various
other policy statements is either the concession that the Administration
lacked the power to unilaterally pursue its education agenda or that
doing so was politically unwise. Regardless, when it did not receive this
power through reauthorization and its leverage through competitive
grants was gone, the Administration stopped asking Congress for the
power and nudging states to voluntarily comply; it instead took the
power through the waiver process. It eliminated the entirety of the
existing statutory framework and unilaterally replaced it with
something else.
225. See Robinson, supra note 11, at 327, 329-30; Superfine, supra note 192, at 90.
226. See Robinson, supra note 11, at 324-25 ("[Tlhe existing structure of education federalism
led Congress to allow each state to set its own academic standards.").
227. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC, supra note 187, at 2.
228. See Andrew G. Caffrey, No Ambiguity Left Behind: A Discussion of the Clear Statement
Rule and the Unfunded Mandates Clause of No Child Left Behind, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
1129, 1156 (2010).
229. Nick Anderson, Obama Would Scrap 'No Child' Standard, WASH. POST. Feb. 2, 2010, at
All, auailable at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/01/
AR2010020101129.html, archived at http://perma.cclU9X8-TZ7U.
2015] 655
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
The Administration may have always had the legal authority to
impose policy change through waivers and simply never highlighted it.
Having Congress reauthorize the ESEA consistent with the
Administration's policy would have had significant political benefits.
Thus, the Administration could have calculated that it would forego
executive action unless its hand was forced. There is merit to this
narrative. For example, two recent presidents insisted they possessed
the authority to unilaterally deploy American troops into harm's way-
and probably do have such power-but, nonetheless, preferred to get
some form of congressional approval before doing S0.230 On the other
hand, this military example is unique. The Constitution vests the
President with unilateral authority internationally that it does not vest
domestically. 231
In addition, it is hard to square the President and Secretary's
claims that legislative change is necessary with later claims that the
exact "change" they had requested could be achieved without actually
amending the legislation. It is even harder when the authority by which
the Secretary purports to achieve all of the Administration's desired
substantive policy change is encompassed within the simple (albiet
significant) power to waive statutory provisions. If such a power
existed, one would have expected the Administration to, at least, signal
that it would use this power if Congress did not act, as a means of
spurring Congress. In short, while the events leading up to the waivers
do not definitively resolve the issues surrounding the executive
authority to pursue policy through waivers, the events offer no evidence
that the executive believed that it had such power. Instead, the facts
suggest implicit concessions that the Administration lacked such a
power and only offered a rationalization for that power once it became
clear the legislative process would not yield the results it desired.
More important, this backstory helps define the scope of NCLB
and the waiver conditions. Even if the constitutional authority to
condition waivers exists, the power would be limited by scope
230. See, e.g., Peter Baker & Jonathan Weisman, Obama Seeks Approval by Congress for
Strike in Syria, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2013, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/09/01/world/middleeast/syria.html?pagewanted=all&_r-O, archived at http://perma.cc/
K6V7-C9RA; Louis Fisher, Deciding on War Against Iraq: Institutional Failures, 118 POL. SCI. Q.
389, 395-96 (2003) (discussing President Bush's initial conclusion that he did not need
authorization to go to war in Iraq and his later decision to ask Congress for approval); Letter from
the President to Congress (Feb. 11, 2015), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/20 15/02/1 1/letter-president-authorization-use-united-states-armed-forces-connection,
archived at http://perma.ccIL285-LB9E (requesting authorization from Congress for use of force
against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant).
231. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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analysis. 232 As emphasized in later sections, determining whether
agency action falls within the scope of statutory language or a statute's
overall framework raises questions of substance and inference. 233 On
this point, the ways in which the Administration framed NCLB, RTT,
reauthorization, and the waivers serve as meaningful guideposts.
Without the specter of litigation and the perception bias it would bring,
the Administration articulated and distinguished the scope of those
education policies.
D. A Rushed and Coercive Process
By the end of 2012, forty-five states had submitted requests for
a waiver or flexibility, and the Department later approved all but
two. 2 3 4 The process involved quick but intense interactions between
states and the Department regarding the changes the waiver conditions
would require for teachers and curriculum standards. Iowa experienced
one of the most contentious interactions. According to local officials,
complying with the Department's teacher evaluation requirements-
categorizing teachers by three levels of effectiveness and basing
employment decisions on them-presented a direct conflict with state
law on teachers' rights. 23 5 Some other states had taken executive action
to meet the Department's conditions, but Iowa's governor indicated he
lacked the legal authority to unilaterally implement such a teacher
evaluation system.2 36 The Department's conditions would require
legislative amendments. Iowa's legislature then indicated that such a
significant change to teachers' rights would require serious study and
consideration, 2 37 which precluded the immediate response the
Department was demanding. As a result, the Department denied Iowa's
waiver application.238 Confronting similar problems, a few other states
chose to forgo submitting a waiver application that year.239
232. See Barron & Rakoff, supra note 7, at 325-26.
233. See id.
234. ESEA Flexibility, supra note 5.
235. No Child Left Behind Waiver Request in Iowa Denied by Department of Education,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 25, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/22/dept-of-education-
turns-d n_1620062.html, archived at http://perma.cc/D58U-6LTT.
236. Miker Wiser, Feds Deny Iowa No Child Left Behind Waiver, WATERLOO-CEDAR FALLS
COURIER (June 21, 2012, 9:00 PM), http://wcfcourier.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/feds-deny-
iowa-no-child-left-behind-waiver/article-ee035d3a-bcO9-llel-9db6-0019bb2963f4.html, archived
at http://perma.cc/B92Z-X9HE.
237. See id.
238. Id.
239. See, e.g., John Martin, More States and D.C. Receive NCLB Waivers; Vermont, Alabama,
Nebraska Reject Them, CNN (July 24, 2012, 6:06 AM), http://
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Senator Lamar Alexander, then the ranking member of the U.S.
Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee and now the
chairman, claimed the Department transformed the waiver process
from an application process into a game of "Mother May I?," exacting
huge tolls from states that lacked any leverage. "This simple waiver
authority has turned into a conditional waiver with the [Education]
Secretary having ... authority to make decisions that [are normally
reserved for] state and local governments." 2 4 0 He further accused the
Administration of using its waiver power to subvert the legislative
process, claiming that the Secretary had rewritten the law. 24 1 The
chairman of the House Education and the Workforce Committee shared
Alexander's concerns. 242 Political characterizations aside, the
Secretary's leverage was indisputable. All but a couple of states moved
at breakneck pace-by legislation or executive action-to make the
curriculum and teacher changes necessary to meet the Department's
conditions.
The pace of change may have masked the condition's substantive
breadth from the wider public, but once the change set in, so did the
backlash. Teachers and affiliate organizations in several states
subsequently filed lawsuits challenging the changes as violations of
teachers' state and federal constitutional rights. 243 Likewise, a national
grassroots movement against the Common Core began forming in late
2013 and early 2014.244 By the summer of 2014, some states had passed
legislation to repeal the prior executive or legislative action adopting
it;245 others were considering following suit; 24 6 and others were
schoolsofthought.blogs.cnn.com/2012/07/24/more-states-and-d-c-receive-nclb-waivers-vermont-
alabama-nebraska-reject-them, archived at http://perma.ccW3VJ-NA9T.
240. Klein, supra note 24; see also McNeil & Klein, supra note 222, at 31 (urging states to
simply submit applications rather than play the game).
241. Alyson Klein, Arne Duncan Makes Sales Pitch for Waivers, Turnarounds, Early Ed in
Senate Hearing, EDUC. WEEK BLOG (Apr. 30, 2014, 2:46 PM),
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k- 12/2014/04/arneduncan-makes-sales-pitch_.html?q
s=Arne+Duncan+Makes+Sales+Pitch+for+Waivers, archived at http://perma.cc/S2LA-BHL6.
242. McNeil & Klein, supra note 222.
243. See Derek Black, North Carolina's Teacher Tenure Repeal Found Unconstitutional,
EDUC. LAW PROF BLOG (May 21, 2014), http:/llawprofessors.typepad.com/education _law2014/05/
north-carolinas-teacher-tenure-repeal-found-unconstitutional.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
BJZ8-H6ZP.
244. Joseph P. Williams, Who Is Fighting Against Common Core?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT (Feb. 27, 2014, 3:58 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/special-reports/a-guide-to-
common-core/articles/2014/02/27/who-is-fighting-against-common-core, archived at http://
perma.cc/CU32-NJMD.
245. Valerie Strauss, Two More States Pull Out of Common Core, WASH. POST ANSWER SHEET
BLOG (June 5, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogslanswer-sheet/wp/2014/06/05/two-
more-states-pull-out-of-common-corel, archived at http://perma.cclS48B-H94G.
246. Id.
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embroiled in litigation challenging whether the adoption of the
Common Core violated state law. 247 In short, the waiver process's front-
end efficiency was largely a product of the states having little choice but
to side-step difficult local problems of politics and law, which resurfaced
later when important constituents caught up to the change.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY FLAWS OF No CHILD LEFT
BEHIND WAIVERS
The particular conditions that the Department required of states
in exchange for waivers raise both constitutional and statutory
problems. First, when states initially agreed to the terms of NCLB in
2001, they had no notice that they would be subject to new conditions
should they later need to apply for a waiver. Congress could have put
states on notice, but it did not. Thus, the waiver conditions likely violate
the constitutional requirement of clearly stated conditions on federal
spending. Second, the imposition of these conditions occurred under
particularly coercive circumstances. Ten years into NCLB's multiyear
program, the Secretary told states they would be subject to the Act's
sanctions and loss of funds unless they agreed to his new unilateral
conditions. Although the coercion was not identical to Sebelius, the
relevant factors are substantially the same: unforeseeable changes,
transformation of an entrenched program into a new one, and high
stakes that deprived states of meaningful choice.
The third and most fatal flaw is the absence of any explicit
statutory authority authorizing the Secretary to condition waivers.
Even if one inferred an authority to condition waivers, the particular
conditions the Department imposed are beyond the scope of NCLB.
Thus, either way, Congress has not delegated the authority that the
agency, in fact, exercised. Moreover, serious constitutional questions
arise as to whether Congress could delegate such a power under these
circumstances. The conditional waiver power exercised by the
Department would potentially amount to the broadest and most
expansive delegated power ever afforded an agency and, as such, goes
beyond the Court's already permissive precedent regarding delegations
of power. In short, while conditional waivers may be constitutional as a
general matter, they have statutory and constitutional limits, which the
247. See, e.g., Pack v. State, 330 P.3d 1216 (Okla. 2014) (per curiam); Complaint, Bateman v.
Utah State Bd. of Educ. (Utah Dist. Ct. July 31 2014), available at
http://libertasutah.org/drop/commoncorelawsuit.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4R3M-EEQC.
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Department's conditions transgressed. The following sections address
each of these analyses in turn.
A. Inadequate Notice of Conditions
The most exacting Spending Clause limitation is that any
conditions placed on federal funds must be clearly and unambiguously
stated when the state receives the funds. 248 NCLB clearly states that
the Secretary has waiver power, but NCLB makes no mention of a
power to condition waivers. The waiver provision does add that a state's
applications for waiver must explain how a waiver will "(i) increase the
quality of instruction for students; and (ii) improve the academic
achievement of students," 249 and must include "measurable educational
goals" and methods for measuring and meeting those goals.250 These
requirements, however, are expressed as the points to which an
application should speak and, thus, the criteria by which the Secretary
should evaluate applications. They give no notice that some specific
conditions beyond those broad criteria might be imposed on a state. To
the contrary, the provisions explicitly articulate a waiver request
process driven by state applications and the Secretary's evaluation of
them based on an application's ability to meet broadly articulated goals,
not on a Secretary's preconceived conditions. The Secretary can deny
those applications based on his discretionary judgment, but not based
on a predefined litmus test with no grounding in statutory text.
Even if one reasoned that the statutory criteria for granting
waivers implied an authority to condition waivers, the permissible
conditions would be limited to those falling squarely within those
criteria and the scope of the overall statute. An open-ended authority
that gave the Secretary significant flexibility in fashioning conditions
on funds would be inconsistent with the clear statement rule because a
funding recipient would have insufficient notice of the conditions that
it might be required to meet later. At most, states would be on notice
that NCLB's terms are subject to change, but the clear statement rule
requires notice of the future terms themselves. 251 Notice of the
possibility that change may occur does not provide this.
The Department might counter that while the statute did not
provide specific notice, the agency gave states notice prior to imposing
the conditions. It is enough that the statute provided notice of future
248. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
249. 20 U.S.C. § 7861(b)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) (2012).
250. § 7861(b)(1)(C).
251. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
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change by the agency, so long as the agency did not apply the changes
retroactively. In the context of statutory frameworks that do not entail
multiyear projects and compliance that is interconnected across time,
that position might warrant consideration, but it does not here. NCLB
was developed as a multiyear program spanning the course of more
than a decade. 252 Upon accepting NCLB funds in year one, states
committed to developing their own curricular standards and tests and
to set course upon progressive yearly academic progress, for which they
were accountable on a yearly basis. 253 Once they began the process,
changing course along the way was untenable. The Department's
waiver conditions, however, do exactly that: demand changes to states'
existing programs midstream. In that respect, they are post facto or
retroactive conditions of which a state must have had notice at the time
of the passage of NCLB, not simply prior to their post facto
development. In other words, NCLB conditions that substantively
change the law are equivalent to changing the rules of a sporting event
in the final minutes of the game. Fair play is not preserved simply
because both teams know the rules going forward.
Most fatal to any clear notice defense of the NCLB waiver
conditions is the fact that Congress was so definite in the articulation
of all the other conditions it intended to place on states, including an
articulation of the conditions that it was not imposing. First, NCLB
articulated a detailed and lengthy set of conditions for adopting state
standards, testing, teacher quality, accountability, and sanctions. 25 4
The specific articulation of a detailed framework of statutory conditions
is inconsistent with the notion of an unstated, open-ended agency power
to replace NCLB's express condition with something new. Yet, this is
what the Department did. By its own words, it imposed conditions that
"re-envision[ed the] federal role in education" and "renovat[ed] a flawed
law" 2 55 with reforms that "were not anticipated when the No Child Left
Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) was enacted nearly a decade ago." 256
Second, Congress specifically articulated the limits of its
detailed framework, should they be later mistaken:
252. See Ryan, supra note 8, at 940-41; Superfine, supra note 192, at 89-90.
253. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(A)-(C) (requiring "adequate yearly progress"); Ryan, supra note 8,
at 939-41.
254. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (2012) (adopting "challenging academic standards");
§ 6311(b)(2) (testing at least once annually for students in grades three through eight and once in
high school); § 6311(b)(2)(A)-(C) (requiring schools to make "adequate yearly progress" for
accountability); §§ 6319(a)(2), 7801(23) (requiring a "highly qualified" teacher in every public
school classroom); § 6316 (b)(5)(B), (b)(8)(B) (declaring sanctions for failing schools).
255. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 16, at 2 (presidential letter introducing the blueprint).
256. Letter from Arne Duncan, supra note 213.
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Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize an officer or employee of the
Federal Government to mandate, direct, or control a State, local educational agency, or
school's specific instructional content, academic achievement standards and assessments,
curriculum, or program of instruction, as a condition of eligibility to receive funds under
this chapter. 257
The college- and career-ready standards waiver condition is contrary to
this limit. The most forgiving reading of this waiver condition is that it
demands a type of curriculum, standard, or program of instruction-
college and career ready-without demanding a specific curriculum.
This forgiving reading, however, fails because, as practically
understood, the Department did demand a specific curriculum,
standard, or program of instruction: the Common Core. 2 58 Moreover,
even if not a demand for specific curriculum, it was a demand for a
sufficiently specific type of curriculum that the demand is inconsistent
with the statute.
Finally, the overarching structure of NCLB is one built, at every
level, on states determining educational content, delivery, and teacher
quality. 259 The federal government's role is limited to ensuring that
states follow through on the substance to which states themselves
commit. 2 6 0 The waiver conditions represent a shift in decisionmaking,
away from states to the Secretary. 261 The Secretary set the waiver
conditions, and states had to abide by them. The conditions take away
states' primary control over teacher certification, instead mandating
that states adopt a specific type of teacher quality assessment. 262 The
same is true of the college and career ready standards mandate. That
states may retain flexibility at the margins of curriculum and teacher
assessment cannot mask the fact that the waiver conditions direct or
mandate states to do specific things with their curriculum and
teachers. 263 These shifts in substance, curriculum, and decisionmaking
authority are simply too inapposite to the statutory language and
framework of NCLB to reasonably fall within the scope of any clearly
257. 20 U.S.C. § 7371.
258. See Eitel & Talbert, supra note 189, at 21.
259. See Ryan, supra note 8, at 939-942.
260. See id. at 942-43.
261. See Eitel & Talbert, supra note 189, at 24.
262. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 18, at 6.
263. As discussed supra in notes 1 and 190, the meaning of curriculum has become a subject
of intense debate, primarily driven by political objectives, rather than a meaningful discussion of
curriculum. In those notes, this Article takes the position that curriculum includes a host of policy,
implementation, and practical decisions. Thus, rigid distinctions about what is or is not curriculum
are fraught with problems, but those using the Common Core understand it to be curriculum,
controlling of curriculum, or directly related to curriculum. See, e.g., Common Core, supra note
190.
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stated conditions in NCLB. Thus, states could not have anticipated
them when they first agreed to participate in NCLB. 2 6 4
B. Coerced Conditions
1. Altering an Entrenched Program: The Elementary and Secondary
Education Act 1965 to 2012
If Sebelius prohibits "tak[ing] an entrenched federal program
that provides large sums to the states and tell[ing] states they can
continue to participate in that program only if they also agree to
participate in a separate and independent program," 265 the conditions
that the Department placed on NCLB waivers raise constitutional
concerns. In terms of entrenched federal spending programs, the ESEA
ranks toward the top of the list. NCLB is but the current popular title
of the most recent reauthorization and amendment of the ESEA. The
ESEA has been in place since 1965, funding and regulating the
supplemental education of poor and disadvantaged students ever
since.266 During the last two decades, its entrenchment has only grown
deeper, with federal funding and detailed requirements steadily
264. That granting a waiver is within the Secretary's discretion cannot resolve notice
problems either. The right to exercise discretion in executing a statutory waiver process is not
equivalent to the power to impose unlimited conditions as a predicate to the exercise of discretion.
See generally Andrew Dudley, Opening Borders: Congressional Delegation of Discretionary
Authority to Suspend or Repeal the Laws of the United States, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 273 (2009)
(considering the constitutional, practical, and judicial implications of delegating discretionary
authority to the executive branch in exercising a statutory waiver process). While the Secretary is
free to deny waivers within his discretion even though they might speak to the statutory factors,
he may not preclude the consideration of waivers or the possibility of granting waivers based on
conditions and policy objectives not provided for in the statute. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking
Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (striking down agency decision based on the consideration of factors
not included in the statute). To do so is not to exercise discretion, but to impose unilateral policy
beyond the scope of the statute under the guise of discretion.
The Court's reasoning in takings jurisprudence is also instructive on this point. In a series
of cases, the Supreme Court has rejected governments' attempts to use their discretion in granting
permits to exact conditions or concessions from landowners. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water
Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal.
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). That the government could have, in its discretion, rejected
the permit request is of no accord. The government is prohibited from using this discretionary
power to exact conditions that are not related and proportional to the request being made by the
landowner.
265. Bagenstos, supra note 30, at 865. Pasachoff uses different phraseology, but identifies the
same three key inquires. Pasachoff, supra note 63, at 583.
266. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 8, at 937.
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increasing.267 Under NCLB, the program involves multiyear
commitments that cannot simply be switched on and off.
2. Monetary and Nonmonetary Consequences of Saying No
While the fifty-year history and growth of the ESEA strongly
indicate program entrenchment, money still matters, and whether
NCLB funds are sufficiently large to coerce states is less obvious. In
Sebelius, the Court evaluated funding largess in terms of the overall
state budget, focusing on the fact that Medicaid funds accounted for
more than ten percent of states' overall budgets. 268 If this sets the
minimum for establishing coercion, NCLB funds do not come close. But,
if Medicaid funding is only an example and the percentage is not the
sole determinate, NCLB waivers have serious coercive potential. 269
Although the Department has been vague about the financial
consequences of NCLB violations, Eloise Pashachoff reasons that only
Title I funds would be at stake. 270 Those funds were $14.4 billion in total
in 2014.271 This is only two percent of states' K-12 budgets and less
than one percent of states' overall budgets. 27 2 In other words, NCLB
waivers jeopardize funds that have only one-tenth of the impact on state
budgets that Medicaid does.
Evaluating NCLB funding only at the macro-level, however,
understates the statute's coercive power. First, in poorer states like
South Dakota, Mississippi, and Louisiana, federal education funds have
a much stronger foothold. Federal education funds in total, not just
Title I, are more than fifteen percent of education spending in those
states. 2 7 3 And in the nation's poorest districts, federal funds can be more
than thirty percent of a school's budget. 274 Thus, the Department's total
267. See generally Robinson, supra note 11 (detailing the increase in a cooperative federalism
approach to education in the past twenty years).
268. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2581 (2012).
269. See id. at 2663-64 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) ("After Medicaid, the next biggest federal
funding item is aid to support elementary and secondary education, which amounts to 12.8% of
total federal outlays to the States . . . and equals . . . 6.6% of all state expenditures combined.").
270. Michael D. Barolsky, Note, High Schools Are Not Highways: How Dole Frees States From
the Unconstitutional Coercion of No Child Left Behind, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 725, 738 (2008)
("NCLB provides no clear guidance to states on what they stand to lose for violations. The text of
the statute merely directs the Secretary of Education to withhold payment to states upon finding
the state noncompliant with any material provision of the Act.").
271. Federal, State, and Local K-12 School Finance Overview, NEW AM. FOUND. (April 21,
2014, 10:59 PM), available at http://febp.newamerica.net/background-analysis/school-finance,
archived at http://perma.cc/Y5N5-MGL8.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
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or perceived leverage, which it will not clarify, may be greater than Title
I funds alone, particularly since those non-Title I funds still flow
through other titles of the ESEA.
Second, when looking at Title I dollars alone, the impact is still
significant. In several states, Title I funds provide a twenty percent
increase in per pupil funding beyond what the state provides. 275 In a
typical year in North Dakota, Title I provided a thirty-seven percent
increase in spending per pupil.27 6 In other words, without Title I funds,
these states would find it extremely difficult to continue to deliver
education as they know it throughout the state.
Third, the most appropriate level at which to examine the
impact of Title I may be the district level, not the overall state budget.
Medicaid is a state program, and, thus, analysis at that level makes
sense. But education programs operate-and vary significantly-at the
school district level. In many states, courts have forced the state to take
primary responsibility for funding education, but this is not the case in
all states. 2 7 7 Moreover, regardless of the state, in districts with high
concentrations of poverty, Title I funds can amount to a much larger
increase in per pupil expenditures than they do at the state level. 278 For
those districts, which are delegates of the state, the consequences of
losing Title I funds would be catastrophic.
Fourth, the frame of reference with which a state evaluates
education funding is different. Unlike health care, states are
constitutionally obligated to deliver education. 279 Education is the
foremost constitutional responsibility of most states.280 As such, it
dominates state expenditures. Elementary and secondary education is
the single largest budget item for states, amounting to twenty-five
percent of state budgets. 28 1 The next highest state expenditure is
275. See EDUC. TRUST, FUNDING GAPS 2006 at 14 (2006), available at http://www.edtrust.org/
dc/publication/the-funding-gap-0, archived at http://perma.cc/9SQ3-TWPW.
276. Id.
277. Rebell, supra note 22.
278. See generally EDUC. TRUST, supra note 275; see also Black, supra note 22 (explaining
Title I funding formulas and the additional weights affording to districts with larger number and
larger percentages of low income students).
279. Black, supra note 23.
280. See, e.g., Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 91 (Wash. 1978) (recognizing that
"[b]y imposing upon the State a Paramount duty to make ample provision for the education of all
children residing within the State's borders, the [state] constitution has created a 'duty' that is
supreme, preeminent or dominant.").
281. Policy Basics: Where Do Our Tax Dollars Go?, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES
(Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=2783, archived at http://perma.cc/6LLJ-
Y9AN.
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Medicaid at sixteen percent. 282 In California, elementary and secondary
education is thirty-nine percent of the budget.283 At the local level,
education can consume an even larger percentage of the budget. 284 In
other words, Title I dollars appear relatively small because states'
education obligations are so large. But regardless of their relative size,
Title I dollars offset a meaningful portion of the cost of states' foremost
and largest constitutional obligation. If states lost those federal funds,
state constitutional law would force many states to replace those federal
funds. 285 The same is not true of Medicaid.
Finally, more than money is at stake with a NCLB violation.
States and districts are also subject to sanctions and stigma. NCLB
sanctions would label states' premier constitutional programs as
failures and demand structural reforms. 28 6 Professor Daniels, in his
wide-ranging analysis of federal agency powers, specifically identifies
NCLB's accountability measures as a "regulatory nuke" because they
are destructive and politically taboo. 287 The stigma of suffering a
"regulatory nuke" cannot be underestimated either. Local communities
have expressed opposition to NCLB and federal oversight in
education, 288 but the political consequences of failure and restructuring
would be heavily, if not almost exclusively, felt at the local level.
Appointed and elected state and local education officials would be the
"failures" who face job loss, not federal officials and politicians. As the
Court has elsewhere indicated, inverting political accountability can
increase coercion. 289
In sum, while NCLB funding levels do not approach those of
Medicaid, NCLB exerts a level of coercion that far exceeds the raw
dollars at stake. Title I dollars cover a significant percentage of the cost
of educating low-income children, whom states are obligated to educate
with or without federal money, and violations of NCLB carry serious
282. Id.
283. CAL. BUDGET PROJECT, Where Do California's Tax Dollars Go? (July 2011),
http://calbudgetcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/110728_WhereDoStateTaxDollarsGo-pb.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/85UB-KZM9.
284. See, e.g., id.
285. See generally Ross Wiener, Strengthening Comparability: Advancing Equity in Public
Education, in ENSURING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN PUBLIC EDUCATION: How LOCAL SCHOOL
DISTRICT FUNDING PRACTICES HURT DISADVANTAGED STUDENTS AND WHAT FEDERAL POLICY CAN
Do ABOUT IT 40 (2008) (explaining the existing problems with the comparability requirement for
Title I funding).
286. See Daniels, supra note 119, at 464.
287. Id. at 450, 464.
288. See L. Darnell Weeden, Essay, Does the No Child Left Behind Law (NCLBA) Burden the
States as an Unfunded Mandate Under Federal Law?, 31 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 239 (2006).
289. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602-03 (2012) (plurality opinion).
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political and structural consequences beyond money. These realities
tipped the scales to the point where some states may have had no real
choice but to comply with whatever conditions the Department of
Education put forward in 2012.290 The time had already passed for
legislative reform. Compliance through waiver conditions was the only
remaining viable option. That several complied against their free will
is further supported by the fact many states, in the midst of budget
shortfalls, had rejected these same conditions and foregone equally
large sums of money in the RTT application process. 29 1 They could not
do the same under NCLB.
3. Transforming No Child Left Behind into a Nationalized Education
Program and Teacher Assessment
The foregoing coercion is of no consequence under Sebelius
unless the federal government is also insisting that the states sign onto
a separate and independent program to remain eligible under the initial
program.2 92 On this factor, the waivers would appear to replicate the
Affordable Care Act's flaw. To remain eligible for NCLB funding, the
waiver conditions forced states to implement four new policies, which,
as emphasized above, the Administration touted as moving education
in a different direction. These new policies were a change in kind, not
just degree from NCLB, which, as Sebelius emphasizes, would
distinguish them from the expected year-to-year tinkering with federal
programs. 293 Thus, the conditional waivers, as exercised, likely meet the
final Sebelius factor.
As a final note, one might argue that the Sebelius analysis is
altogether inapplicable to waiver conditions because waiver conditions
involve agency action rather than congressional action. This defense,
however, would implicitly concede that the Department was acting
290. To be clear, several states had already voluntarily taken steps to adopt the Common Core
and teacher evaluation systems prior to the waiver process. This Article's analysis is most directly
applicable to those states that took action only in response to federal demands, but it is still broadly
applicable on the question of the Secretary's and Congress's authority. That many states may have
agreed with the Secretary's conditions may mean those states have no compulsion claim, but the
absence of compulsion does not render the Secretary's action authorized by statute or constitution.
In New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), the Court rejected the United States' argument
that it could compel state action in regard to radioactive waste pursuant to the Commerce Clause
because the states had asked the United States to set up an interstate compact. Although
proceeding as a Tenth Amendment claim to limit Congress's Commerce Clause power, the case is
instructive on the question of the limits of Spending Clause authority.
291. Superfine, supra note 192, at 107.
292. See Bagenstos, supra note 30, at 865-66.
293. See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2605 (plurality opinion); Eitel & Talbert, supra note 189, at
24.
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beyond the scope of congressional authority. If conditional waivers of
the sort exercised by the Department were authorized by Congress,
Sebelius applies because the waiver conditions are congressional
conditions. If the conditions were not authorized by Congress, Sebelius
might not apply, but the defense of the agency conditions would
implicitly concede the lack of agency authority. Either way, the waiver
conditions would fail.
C. Exceeding Statutory Authority and the Constitutional Problem with
Granting It
Agencies can only exercise powers delegated to them by
Congress,2 94 and Congress can only delegate those powers that the
Constitution permits. 295 Thus, constitutional concerns aside, for the
Department of Education to possess the power to condition waivers,
NCLB would have to expressly articulate such a power and the
conditions an agency might impose, or imply a conditional power. An
implied power, however, would limit permissible conditions to those
falling within the scope of the statute. While NCLB explicitly granted
the Secretary waiver power, it did not explicitly grant the power to
condition those waivers, much less mention the permissible substance
of those conditions. Thus, if the power to condition NCLB waivers
exists, it is an implied power. But an implied power would not justify
the particular conditions the Secretary imposed because they went
beyond the scope of NCLB.
The conditions the Secretary imposed were so broad that it is not
clear that Congress could, in advance, have articulated a conditional
waiver power to justify them. The grant of power would have been so
broad and unconstrained that a strong argument against its
constitutionality would arise. It would have been not a power to waive
NCLB-which Congress can grant-and not just the power to remake
NCLB within certain limits after the waiver-which Congress can also
grant. It would have been a power to eviscerate NCLB and remake it
any way the Secretary sees fit. Such a power would lack an intelligible
principle and vest all educational law making power in the Secretary.
294. See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)
(analyzing statutory language to determine what authority Congress explicitly or implicitly
granted to the agency).
295. Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
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This would be unconstitutional. The following sections take up each of
these issues-statutory power and constitutional power-in turn.
1. Exceeding Limited Statutory Authority
An analysis of the scope of statutory authority that NCLB grants
the Secretary largely mirrors the earlier application of the clear
statement rule to NCLB waivers and need not be rehashed in detail
here. It suffices to say that NCLB's statutory text extends the power to
waive, but it says nothing of a power to condition waivers. It only
indicates that states shall apply for waivers. States' waiver applications
must identify educational goals, set measurements for those goals, and
explain how a waiver will "increase the quality of instruction" and
"improve the academic achievement." 296 The statute provides that the
Secretary "may" waive NCLB's provisions and, thus, explicitly grants
him discretion in doing so. That discretion, however, pertains to his
judgment of whether an application meets those objectives or is wise to
approve. It is not an explicit grant of authority for the Secretary to
establish narrow parameters or conditions under which he will grant
an application, notwithstanding the merit an application otherwise
presents in meeting statutory objectives. 297 In short, the waiver power
does not include an explicit power to condition waivers.
One might argue that the power to condition waivers is implied
or inherent in the power to grant a waiver. 298 As demonstrated above,
however, an implied power to condition has limits. It is not an implied
power to remake the law as the Secretary sees fit. At most, it is an
implied power to impose conditions that fall within the scope of the
existing statute. Waiver, by name and definition, is the authority to
exempt an entity from the law's application. 299 As to this authority,
NCLB specified the circumstances under which the Department has the
authority to exempt states. While the Secretary may have discretion as
to when and who to exempt, the power is framed as a narrowing of the
296. 20 U.S.C. § 7861(b)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) (2012).
297. To use discretionary government power to achieve ulterior objectives not provided for by
law is central to the Court's takings jurisprudence. The Court has prohibited local government
from using its discretionary power to grant land use exemptions or permits to exact
disproportionate or unrelated concessions from landowners. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water
Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal.
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). Of course, this precedent bears no direct relevance to
waivers, but offers a compelling rationale for limiting the ends that government might achieve
through discretionary power. Moreover, those limitations closely correlate with the scope analysis
developed in this article.
298. Barron & Rakoff, supra note 7, at 326.
299. See Waiver, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1718 (9th ed. 2009).
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statute's reach or scope, not an expanding of the statute's scope or
reach. Thus, one might infer a power to impose waiver conditions that
force a state to take additional steps toward complying with NCLB, but
one cannot reasonably infer the power to impose conditions that require
a state to make progress toward ends not embodied by NCLB.
Broad waiver condition power under NCLB would require
explicit statutory authorization. As the Court in Utility Air Regulatory
Group v. EPA.a00 emphasized, "[t]he power of executing the laws
necessarily includes both authority and responsibility to resolve some
questions left open by Congress that arise during the law's
administration. But it does not include a power to revise clear statutory
terms that turn out not to work in practice." 301 Because NCLB has clear
terms that did not work and lacks clear statutory terms for revising
them, the statute does not imply the authority to impose conditions that
alter it. If Congress "wishes to assign to an agency decisions of
vast . . . political significance," Congress must "speak clearly." 302
A less aggressive defense of the Secretary's implied conditional
waiver power would be that the Secretary, in exercising his discretion
to grant waivers, will review the substance of each state's application
and look for aspects of an application that signal compliance with the
statutory requirements for a waiver. "Waiver conditions" might be no
more than an advance articulation of his criteria for evaluation. The
Secretary's transparent advance articulation of the criteria that will
factor into his exercise of discretion does not necessarily transform
discretion into an excess of statutory authority. The criteria could be
guideposts for helping the Secretary measure progress toward
Congress's statutorily articulated goals. For instance, predetermined
waiver criteria, such as substantial compliance in areas A and B, would
assist the Secretary in being fair and consistent and ensuring statutory
compliance. It would also assist states in preparing applications.
Moreover, criteria or guideposts could be defended as reasonable
interpretations of the statutory goal under Chevron deference. 3 0 3
This argument, even if valid, fails to provide a defense for NCLB
waivers. First, the Department did not announce college- and career-
ready standards, data systems, and teacher evaluation as criteria for
assessing the merit of an application. States were not awarded credit
on a sliding scale of how well they performed on these criteria. These
were absolute conditions that a state must meet, regardless of the merit
300. 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
301. Id. at 2446.
302. Id. at 2444.
303. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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or substance otherwise included in the application. 304 Second, and more
important, the conditions did not fall within the scope of NCLB, making
it impossible to conceptualize them as criteria or conditions that
measured or furthered compliance with the Act. As the Court
emphasized in one of its most recent and important administrative law
decisions:
[elven under Chevron's deferential framework, agencies must operate "within the bounds
of reasonable interpretation." And reasonable statutory interpretation must account for
both "the specific context in which ... language is used" and "the broader context of the
statute as a whole." . . .Thus, an agency interpretation that is "inconsisten[t] with the
design and structure of the statute as a whole," does not merit deference. 3 0 5
In other words, the assessment of whether an agency's regulation,
interpretation, condition, or criteria does not operate in a vacuum. The
fact that the Secretary might be able to make a theoretical argument
that the waiver conditions are reasonably related to some aspect of
NCLB is irrelevant.30 6 The appropriate question is whether a broad
conditional waiver power and the particular conditions imposed can
reasonably be framed as falling within the scope and intent of NCLB's
overall provisions and structure, as written.307 The answer is no. The
following subsections substantiate this point in detail.
a. Scope of No Child Left Behind
NCLB is one-thousand pages long, detailing five major
education policies. First, it demands that states develop content and
performance standards in reading, math, and science. 308 Second, states
must develop tests that are aligned with those standards, and
administer them on a regular basis. 309 Third, schools and school
districts must make adequate yearly progress toward the final goal of
one-hundred percent proficiency for all major student demographic
groups on those exams by 2014.310 Fourth, states must hold schools and
districts accountable for progress and impose specific sanctions and
turnaround methods for insufficient progress. 311 Finally, all teachers of
core academic subjects must be "highly qualified," 312 which means that
304. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 18, at 1-3.
305. Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2442 (internal citations omitted).
306. Id.
307. See generally No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425
(2002) (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
308. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (2012).
309. § 6311(b)(2).
310. § 6311(b)(2)(A)-(C), (F).
311. See e.g., § 6316(b)(1)(A), (E)(i); § 6316(b)(5)(B); § 6316(b)(8)(B).
312. § 6319(a)(2).
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a teacher is fully certified and competent based on the teacher's course
of study in college or passing a state-based exam or evaluation. 313
This five-component Act is built on a framework of the federal
government holding states accountable for the substance that states
themselves dictate. States define the curriculum standards, develop the
tests, determine the cut-off scores for passing the tests, and determine
the meaning of "highly qualified" teacher. 314 Whatever its flaws, 315 this
chosen structure for NCLB reflects a "cooperative federalism" approach,
whereby both the state and the federal government share responsibility
under the Act. 316
b. Scope of the Waiver Conditions
The waiver conditions are distinct in both substance and form
from NCLB. First, while NCLB afforded states almost complete
autonomy in regard to curricular standards, the waivers demanded
career- and college-ready standards, which were not mentioned in
NCLB. As a practical matter, states had to adopt the Common Core or
something that closely resembled it. While these standards are a
response to the watered down standards states first adopted under
NCLB, 3 1 7 the fact remains that NCLB did not authorize the
Department then or now to demand specific curriculum or standards. 318
In short, the waivers change the final decisionmaker on curriculum
standards from the states to the federal government. Moreover, such a
shift is explicitly prohibited by statute.319
Second, the waivers conditions make the same shift in regard to
teacher qualifications and eliminate states' authority to independently
313. Id.
314. Ryan, supra note 8, at 947-48, 976.
315. See id. at 947-48 (describing how NCLB encourages states to create easier tests in order
to make it easier for students to achieve proficiency).
316. Pinder, supra note 11, at 11-14; Robinson, supra note 11.
317. See DEREK W. BLACK, EDUCATION LAW: EQUALITY FAIRNESS AND REFORM (2013).
318. 20 U.S.C. § 7371:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize an officer or employee of the
Federal Government to mandate, direct, or control a State, local educational agency, or
school's specific instructional content, academic achievement standards and
assessments, curriculum, or program of instruction, as a condition of eligibility to
receive funds under this chapter."
319. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232a ("No provision of any applicable program shall be construed to
authorize any department , agency, officer, or employee of the United States to exercise any
direction, supervision, or control .... ); § 3403(b) ("No provision of a program administered by the
Secretary or by any other officer of the Department shall be construed to authorize the Secretary
or any such officer to exercise any direction, supervision, or control . . . ."); § 7907(a) ("Nothing in
this chapter shall be construed to authorize an officer or employee of the Federal Government to
mandate, direct, or control a State, local educational agency, or school's curriculum. . . .").
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control how they evaluate teachers. States must evaluate teachers
based on students' progress on standardized exams and then place
teachers in one of three categories of performance. 320 This measure is
partly a response to states' failure to put highly qualified teachers in
every class. 321 In this respect, the condition is generally related to
NCLB's goal of improving teaching but is nonetheless beyond the scope
of the NCLB's specific goal of ensuring qualified teachers and its chosen
approach for doing this. The value-added assessment of teachers based
on students' exam performance and categorization of teachers by
performance are not even remotely intimated by NCLB. NCLB sought
only to differentiate between the qualified and unqualified, and it left
that differentiation to states.
In short, NCLB is an extremely detailed Act that specifically
refrained from addressing the substance of curriculum, standards,
instruction, and teacher certification. These important details were left
undeveloped for an explicit and obvious reason: the substance of those
subjects rested within the domain of states. Through the waivers, the
Department specified those details itself-an authority not belonging to
it-and did so with terms that are inconsistent with NCLB. Thus, the
Department inverted NCLB's state-led "cooperative federalism"
approach to one of federal dictates.
c. Eliminating No Child Left Behind's Centerpiece
Most striking, however, may not be a comparison of NCLB's
scope to the waiver conditions, but the fact that NCLB's centerpiece, if
not primary goal, is gone. NCLB's regime of standardized tests and
teacher certification were not ends in themselves. The purpose was to
create the data and mechanisms through which to hold states and
schools accountable for the achievement of all demographic groups and
to force them to close achievement gaps between them. 32 2 The failure to
do this is what brought states to the point of statutory violation. 323 The
waivers eliminated and replaced this central goal.
The waivers allow states to collapse subgroups into larger
groups-thereby eliminating subgroup accountability-and focus not
on closing achievement gaps but measuring general progress. 324 Of
320. ESEA Flexibility, supra note 5, at 3.
321. BLACK, supra note 317.
322. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., A GUIDE TO EDUCATION AND NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND (2004);
Ryan, supra note 8.
323. See Dillon, supra note 3.
324. See Klein, supra note 24 (discussing concerns about "supersubgroups," which were not
part of the original NCLB law).
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course, waiver power gives the Secretary the authority to excuse states'
failure on this score, but that this primary goal is not part of the waivers
only cements the conclusion that the conditions that the Secretary did
impose are related to new goals and not within the scope of NCLB. This
type of "course reversal" is exactly what the Court in Utility Air
Regulatory Group. v. EPA 32 5 indicated an agency cannot do absent
explicit authorization. An agency cannot, under the guise of reasonable
interpretation, adopt positions that "would overthrow [an] Act's
structure and design." 326
The fact that the Secretary and President had on several prior
occasions distinguished its new education policies from NCLB's
approach, and had gone so far as to call for the Act to be amended to fit
its policies, undermines the argument that those policies could later be
treated as reasonable interpretations of NCLB. Similar prior
admissions in Utility Air were particularly damning to the EPA's
position. 327 And the Court directly chided the EPA for trying to use
reasonable statutory interpretation as the avenue through which to
ram its predetermined policy agenda: "[a]n agency has no power to
'tailor' legislation to bureaucratic policy goals by rewriting
unambiguous statutory terms." 32 8 The historical events preceding
NCLB waivers indicates this is what the Administration did.
2. The Exercise of Unlimited Judgment
The Court's tendency to avoid constitutional issues by striking
down agency power on other statutory grounds, coupled with the
specific absence of conditional waiver power in NCLB, make it unlikely
that the Court would reach the merits of constitutional challenge to
NCLB waivers. Most likely, a court would hold that the Secretary
exceeded his statutory authority in conditioning NCLB waivers, at
least, under current facts. Nonetheless, fleshing out the constitutional
issue is relevant to future reauthorizations of the ESEA, which might
include broader waiver and condition power. The problems this
constitutional analysis reveals should also give courts pause before
entertaining the notion that NCLB implies a waiver power sufficiently
broad to authorize the Secretary's recent conditions.
Congress could easily extend to the Secretary of Education the
authority to condition waivers without transgressing the nondelegation
325. 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
326. Id. at 2442.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 2445.
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doctrine, but the problem presented by the current waivers is distinct
due to the breadth of the conditions imposed. The question here is
whether a power to condition waivers, largely as the Secretary sees fit,
would be a delegation so broad that it would amount to an
unconstitutional delegation of Congress's lawmaking power. A broad
and constitutional waiver delegation might have stated that "the
Secretary shall have the power to waive the forgoing provisions and
impose conditions on the grant of those waivers that facilitate the
improvement of student achievement scores." Since Congress could
have delegated such a power to the Secretary in the first instance
without even bothering to have first articulated its own detailed
accountability, testing, and teaching standards, Congress could grant
the same authority through waiver should Congress's own standards
prove ineffective. These are the circumstances that Barron and Rakoff
envisioned and defended. 32 9
But Congress would be going one step further were it to pass
detailed legislation regulating education, granting the Secretary the
power to waive that legislation, and indicating that the Secretary shall
also have the power to condition waivers with terms that the Secretary
"shall deem appropriate" or "deem consistent with the improvement of
education." No intelligible principle inheres in either of these iterations
of conditions. "Deem appropriate" merely provides that the Secretary
shall have the power to set conditions within his discretion, not that he
should act pursuant to an intelligible principle. One might attempt to
infer that the scope of the underlying statute operates as a limit on the
scope of conditions. Thus, an intelligible principle exists, but such an
inference would be inconsistent with the waiver power granted: to
impose conditions as the Secretary deems appropriate. In other words,
this inference would prove the point: unbounded discretion to condition
lacks an intelligible principle.
"Improvement of education" comes closer to articulating an
intelligible principle. Improvement of education would place some
options-those that hurt public education-off limits. Thus, Congress
would have offered an intelligible principle and a universe of options
within which the Secretary can exercise judgment and discretion. At
the surface level, this would be enough for the Court to uphold the
current waiver conditions. 330
Cutting against this forgiving reading of "improvement of
education" as an intelligible principle is the fact that the universe of
329. Barron & Rakoff, supra note 7, at 270-71, 335-36.
330. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) ("In the history of the
Court we have found the requisite 'intelligible principle' lacking in only [Panama and Schechter.]").
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options that the Secretary could reasonably believe might improve
education is so broad that an "improvement of education" limitation on
conditions is functionally no different than a "shall deem appropriate"
limitation. Save a Secretary whose intent is to destroy education-a
person who presumably could not survive confirmation-any action
that a Secretary believed to be in furtherance of public education could
meet this standard.
This breadth alone does not violate the intelligible principle
standard. The Court has elsewhere found an intelligible principle in the
power to "promulgate regulations fixing prices of commodities which 'in
his judgment will be generally fair and equitable and will effectuate the
[in some respects conflicting] purposes of th[e] Act,"' 331 and in the power
to enact broadcasting regulations in the "public interest." 3 3 2 These cases
may very well represent post facto rationalizations stemming from an
absolute unwillingness to strike down delegation. But to the extent
prior cases are doctrinally and factually grounded, not simply
rationalizations, they are distinct from a broad conditional waiver
power for the Secretary of Education, suggesting that an open-ended
conditional waiver power in education goes too far.
First, the context in which a delegation occurs is crucial in
assessing the permissible breadth of the delegating language. In
Whitman, the Court indicated "that the degree of agency discretion that
is acceptable varies according to the scope of the power congressionally
conferred." 333 For instance, "Congress need not provide any direction to
the EPA regarding the manner in which it is to define 'country
elevators,' which are to be exempt from new-stationary-source
regulations governing grain elevators," but "it must provide substantial
guidance on setting air standards that affect the entire national
economy." 3 3 4 In short, the thing to be regulated plays a significant role
in determining how specific the intelligible statutory principle should
be.
Second, while the delegating language in prior cases may have
been broad, either statutory language or the context in which the
language was to operate narrowed the power. For instance, National
Broadcasting v. United StateS335 involved one of the broadest forms of
331. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420, 423-26, (1944).
332. Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26, (1943); see also N.Y. Cent. Secs.
Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24-25 (1932) (Interstate Commerce Commission's power to
approve railroad consolidations).
333. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 475 (citing Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 772-73 (1996);
United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1975)).
334. Id.
335. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
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delegatory language one could imagine: "in the public interest." But the
context in which that delegation occurred was relatively narrow: public
broadcasting. The contexts of regulation-radio and television-and
those entities to be regulated were both relatively small in number.336
Moreover, the power at issue was not the power to generally regulate
broadcasting "in the public interest" but the narrower power to grant
public broadcasting licenses.337 The Court also emphasized that "public
interest" was not "a mere general reference to public welfare without
any standard to guide determinations"; rather, Congress articulated
the term to be understood in light of the agency's experience in the
market of granting licenses. 338 Thus, the Secretary was not free to grant
or deny licenses based on anything he deemed to be in the public
interest. Under these circumstances, the intelligible principle was
broad on its face but, in context, had a more specific meaning and
operated within a bounded context in which the number of available
options was necessarily small.
Likewise, the EPA's regulation of the environment may appear
limitless, but statutory language explicitly narrows the scope in which
broad delegating language operates. The EPA does not possess the
power to regulate the environment in general. It only possesses the
much narrower power to regulate certain aspects of the environment-
air, water, and waste-and only activities that emit particular
"pollutants" in those aspects of the environment. 339 Thus, again, broad
delegating language is not necessarily equivalent to broad or unlimited
power.
The same would not be true in regard to a broad power to
condition waivers in education. The field of education itself is
particularly broad-unlike broadcasting-and is not limited by
categories, criteria, or activities-unlike the environment. An authority
to condition waivers, limited only by the authority "to improve
education," would permit a Secretary to impose almost any education
strategy he could imagine. Thereby, the Secretary could control the
operating procedures for over 13,000 school districts; the entire
universe of things that that each of our nation's approximately 100,000
public schools might teach and how (along with sanctions for failing to
do so); certification and employment terms for 3.1 million teachers; and
grade promotion, graduation, and future life chances for 49.8 million
336. Id. at 216.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 226 (citing N.Y. Cent. Secs. Corp.v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24-25 (1932)).
339. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001) (noting that the text
of the Clean Air Act requires the EPA to set standards for a "discrete set of pollutants").
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students.34 0 Local school boards and superintendents currently oversee
the largest, most visible, and most substantive expenditures in every
community in the country. An open-ended conditional waiver power
would grant the Secretary power over them all. Thus, delegations of
power in education, per Whitman's reasoning, should require a more
definite intelligible principle than many of the cases that have
previously come before the Court.
Third, the nature of public education itself, and the delivery of
it, involves pedagogical and value-based assessments that are
fundamentally different from many other areas of regulation. 341 For
instance, although not a perfect science, the regulation of air and water
pollutants involves scientific data and research. 342 An agency might
exercise judgment in regard to how much particulate to allow in the air
or water, but the existence of particulate and its harmfulness along a
spectrum are scientific facts that are not in question.343 Likewise, the
Food and Drug Administration may make judgments about how "safe"
or "efficacious" a food or drug must be, but hard science establishes the
underlying safety or efficacy. 344
The same cannot be said in education. There are open debates
about what should be taught, how long to teach, and how to test or
evaluate students, and relatively little hard evidence to substantiate
competing claims. Even when consensus is reached on an item, all must
readily admit that our assessments of students are rough
approximations of what they learned. For these reasons, tough
educational questions have, thus far, been answered by state and local
elected officials. In other words, the democratic process answers these
questions; it does not delegate them to the federal executive. To defer
to the agency in regard to these educational judgments is not to defer
to objective expertise but to permit the agency to decide disputed value
judgments. The struggle over these disputed values has always
occurred between local, state, and federal democratic bodies, not
between state democratic bodies and federal administrative bodies.
340. Fast Facts: Back to School Statistics, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICs, http://
nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=372, archived at http://perma.cc/FKT5-4XAP (last visited Jan.
16, 2015).
341. See BLACK, supra note 317.
342. See, e.g., Am. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. EPA., 559 F.3d 512 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (discussing the
role that the recommendations of the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee and other scientific
data play in the Environmental Protection Agency's air quality standards).
343. Id.
344. See James O'Reilly, Jurisdiction to Decide an Agency's Own Jurisdiction: The Forgotten
Tale of the Hynson Quartet, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 829 (2006).
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The foregoing distinctions, at the very least, caution against
lightly assuming that Congress could delegate an unbounded
conditional waiver power to the Department of Education, or any
agency for that matter, if the substance of the thing to be regulated is
itself relatively unbounded. Granting the Secretary of Education the
authority to waive major aspects of NCLB and impose conditions as the
Secretary sees fit in exchange would likely be the most expansive
delegation of authority to date, and one devoid of any intelligible or
meaningful limiting principle. Thus, relying on the sliding scale
principle of Whitman, a conditional waiver power in education requires
either that the statute explicitly narrow the field of education in which
that conditional power might operate or articulate a precise principle
by which the Secretary might condition waivers. Without explicit
bounds, a conditional waiver in education is, as a practical matter,
necessarily a power lacking in an intelligible limiting principle.
V. CONCLUSION
With no more power than the authority to waive noncompliance
with NCLB, Secretary Arne Duncan achieved a goal that educational
equality advocates had long sought but never secured: the
federalization of certain aspects of public education. His path to the
"holy grail" of education, however, was fundamentally flawed. He only
reached it by imposing waiver conditions that were neither explicitly
nor implicitly authorized by the text of NCLB. Thus, he exceeded his
statutory authority and violated the Constitution's clear notice
requirements regarding conditions on federal funds.
States only acceded to these new and unforeseeable terms
because their impending noncompliance with NCLB put so much at
stake financially, practically, and politically. By the time Secretary
Duncan announced the conditions, states were devoid of options and left
in a position where the Secretary could compel them to accept terms
that, under most any other circumstances, they would reject. The
Administration took the states' vulnerability as an opportunity to
unilaterally impose policy that had already failed in Congress. In doing
so, the Administration may have unconstitutionally coerced states.
An explicit grant of conditional waiver power could have cured
some of these problems but not all. To have justified conditions as broad
as Secretary Duncan's, the statute would have had to either explicitly
authorize the types of conditions Secretary Duncan imposed or
explicitly grant him an open-ended authority to condition waivers. The
former is implausible because Congress does not possess perfect
foresight. The latter is unconstitutional because it would not have been
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constrained by an intelligible principle. The latter also would have
granted the Secretary a power broader than any other previously
approved by the Court.
The import of this analysis reaches far beyond education. An
agency power to remake the law through statutory waivers may be a
useful and an efficient mechanism for adapting laws to changing
circumstances and needs. Congress can, and likely will, explicitly
extend this authority to some agencies in the future. But as the
experience of NCLB's conditional waivers demonstrates, conditional
waiver power, if not carefully circumscribed, is fraught with practical
and constitutional dangers. It has the potential to give agencies a power
that exceeds that of the legislation under which the agency is acting.
The executive could unilaterally achieve ends that neither it nor
Congress could have achieved through negotiated legislation, including
bringing states further under the regulation of agencies than the
organic statute the agency is waiving. In these respects, conditional
waiver authority can threaten the balance of powers the Constitution
secures between states and the federal government, and between
Congress and the executive. Thus, it is no surprise that the NCLB
waiver process has sparked a series of bitter legal fights at all branches
of local, state, and federal government, with Congress suing the
President over its use of executive power, state boards of education
suing state legislatures and vice versa over the Common Core
Curriculum, and teachers and students suing states over changes to
teacher evaluation and retention rights. Next in line is a direct
challenge to the Secretary of Education's authority to impose and
enforce the conditions it exacted in exchange for NCLB waivers.
680 [Vol. 68:3:607
